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Abstract
The Dublin Core 1:1 Principle asserts that “related but conceptually different entities, for exam-
ple a painting and a digital image of the painting, are described by separate metadata records”
(Woodley et al., 2005). While this seems to be a simple requirement, studies of metadata quality
have found that cultural heritage metadata frequently does not conform to the Principle. Instead,
representations commonly appear to make statements about multiple related resources, such as a
painting and a digital surrogate that depicts the painting. Although these “violations” of the Prin-
ciple are assumed to reduce metadata quality, they are widespread in cultural heritage metadata,
and metadata creators indicate “a great deal of confusion” about what the Principle means and
what constitutes a violation (Park & Childress, 2009).
A conceptual analysis of the 1:1 Principle reveals that it is the product of an encounter between
two different paradigms, with distinct approaches to how descriptions function, that have domi-
nated the development of Dublin Core. The knowledge organization (KO) paradigm draws from a
century of practice developing bibliographic representations and rules for description in libraries,
archives, and museums (LAMs). This paradigm is primarily concerned with the organization and
classification of document surrogates. It does not provide a formal account of how bibliographic
languages describe and reference the resources they represent. In contrast, the knowledge rep-
resentation (KR) paradigm is influenced by recent computer science, linguistics, and philosophy.
This paradigm is primarily concerned with supporting automatic inference and data integration,
mobilizing formal semantic theories to provide descriptions with grammatical structures that can
be computationally modeled. It provides an explicit and formal, although not untroubled, account
of reference and description.
Further analysis of how discussion of the 1:1 Principle has been shaped by these two different
approaches to description shows that 1:1 Principle problems are as much about the design and
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function of representation languages as they are about errors made by metadata creators. The
Principle is most directly derived from the formal theories of description and reference that use
proper names (or identifiers like URIs) to refer directly to resources.
Bibliographic records with fixed syntaxes, but informal, colloquial semantics, can successfully
communicate descriptions that are meaningful to human interpreters and enable syntactic interoper-
ability between systems. However, when viewed through the lens of formal semantics, bibliographic
representations may appear incoherent—as failing to unambiguously reference any resource, or pro-
vide a single, shared semantic interpretation of descriptions. These problems are exacerbated by
the need to make subtle ontological choices about descriptions of resources involved in equivalent,
derivative, or descriptive relationships.
Because knowledge organization representations rely on relatively informal semantics, often not
more than a sentence or two of natural-language prose, the heuristics for identifying 1:1 Principle
violations depend heavily on the implicit and informal, shared conceptual framework of cultural
heritage professionals. A formal interpretation of these heuristics, therefore, requires more than
operational definitions of the Principle; it requires highly expressive ontologies that make that
understanding logically explicit. Moreover, even formalizing traditional ontological distinctions
will fail to identify violations when contingent historical facts play a role in interpretations of
metadata records.
While these difficulties make fully reliable methods for automatic detection of 1:1 Principle
violations impossible in principle, they usefully reveal obstacles that will require attention as the
cultural heritage community moves towards adopting more formal representation practices that
are the basis of the Semantic Web and Linked Data. Recognition of the fundamental differences
between the knowledge organization paradigm and the knowledge representation paradigm can lay
the groundwork for reconceptualizing how we represent related resources.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
As Operations Coordinator for the Colorado Digitization Program (CDP),1 I was introduced to
the complexities of creating metadata for cultural heritage resources. When I became involved in
large-scale digitization efforts, Dublin Core was emerging as an essential piece of infrastructure for
recording, storing, and exchanging information from libraries, archives, and museums (LAMs). As
one of the later editors of the CDP Dublin Core Metadata Best Practices (DCMBP) (Collabora-
tive Digitization Program, 2006), I had a front-row seat in the deliberations of CDP’s Metadata
Working Group. This group of experienced professionals sought to provide guidance for creating
good descriptions of cultural heritage beyond the simple definitions provided by the Dublin Core
Metadata Initiative (DCMI). Ultimately, CDP’s recommendations closely conformed to existing
library and museum rules of description, especially rules for describing reproductions. In order to
make it clear that some information was about original resources and some information was about
digital reproductions, CDP extended the basic Dublin Core element set to include properties such
as date.original or format.digital (Bishoff & Garrison, 2000; Cronin, 2008). The distinction
between information about “digital” vs. “original” things was also preserved in our local data
model, which stored this information in separate relational tables. Members of the working group
saw these recommendations as a pragmatic and efficient solution to the problem at hand. As an
early set of guidelines, the DCMBP served as a model for other regional and local practices and
was widely promoted by the Institute of Museum and Library Services and in other high-level
guidelines.2 The impact of the CDP DCMBP continues through various adaptations and current
1Later the Collaborative Digitization Program.
2Such as the NINCH Guide to Good Practice (NINCH, 2002) and A Framework of Guidance for Building Good
Digital Collections (National Information Standards Organization, 2007).
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practices in many cultural heritage organizations in the United States.
While these recommendations worked well within the CDP environment, subsequent studies
of cultural heritage metadata quality raised concerns that this kind of approach results in records
that violate the Dublin Core 1:1 Principle:
In general, Dublin Core metadata describes one manifestation or version of a resource,
rather than assuming that manifestations stand in for one another. For instance, a jpeg
image of the Mona Lisa has much in common with the original painting, but it is not
the same as the painting. As such the digital image should be described as itself, most
likely with the creator of the digital image included as a Creator or Contributor, rather
than just the painter of the original Mona Lisa. The relationship between the metadata
for the original and the reproduction is part of the metadata description, and assists
the user in determining whether he or she needs to go to the Louvre for the original, or
whether his/her need can be met by a reproduction. (Hillmann, 2003)
These studies (Stvilia et al., 2004; Hutt & Riley, 2005; Shreeves et al., 2005, 2006; Han et al., 2009)
have found that cultural heritage metadata records often lack coherence because they describe
features of both physical and digital manifestations of resources. This lack of coherence creates
unwanted barriers for integrating records from multiple institutions into large-scale aggregations
and inhibits the kinds of search and retrieval services that aggregators can provide. Overall, such
records are considered to be lower in quality than is desirable for robust digital library services and
broad interoperability.
This body of research accepts the Dublin Core 1:1 Principle as a necessary requirement for
quality Dublin Core metadata. These analyses are based on fundamental assumptions about what
the 1:1 Principle applies to—for example, the assumption that it is records which must be about
one, and only one, thing. Rarely do these studies attempt to provide a systematic analysis of
the Principle itself, nor do they provide a common interpretation of what counts as a “violation.”
Park & Childress (2009) also demonstrate that there is “a great deal of confusion” about what the
Principle means and how it should be implemented by practitioners tasked with conforming to it.
The objective of this dissertation is to provide the clarity that is missing from current research
and guidance for metadata practitioners about the Dublin Core 1:1 Principle. In what follows,
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we will explore the fundamental concepts that Hillmann (2003) tries to communicate and how
these concepts do or do not align with accepted cataloging practices within the cultural heritage
domain. Unpacking the 1:1 Principle reveals that the problems in this area arise not simply from
the behavior of metadata creators, but more fundamentally from the nature of how descriptions
function as meaningful linguistic constructs. Probing our confusions about the 1:1 Principle sug-
gests two distinct paradigms for solving the problem of description. By outlining the contours of
each paradigm, we can improve our understanding of the apparently rampant violations observed
by studies of metadata quality. While the 1:1 Principle may seem like a minor and insignificant
problem, this study demonstrates that it is extremely important to understand the underlying
paradigms as the cultural heritage community moves towards adopting Semantic Web and Linked
Data approaches to representation and description.
1.2 Approach
The study that follows is carried out as a combination of historical and conceptual analysis. Viewed
abstractly, it involves first identifying publications and documents that represent the evolving
attitudes, ideas, and practices of key communities during the relevant periods of time. It closely
analyzes portions of documents that use or discuss the concepts of interest. This analysis focuses
not solely on essential logical features, but also on the objectives and influences that have driven
the adoption of particular descriptive frameworks. This is partly to conjecture likely patterns
of influence and intention, but also to present the historical context needed for insight into, and
interpretation of, the Dublin Core 1:1 Principle in the face of apparent incoherence.
This study is primarily weighted towards conceptual analysis, although it does rely on historical
reference materials. Among these are evolving versions of Dublin Core standards documents (Hill-
mann, 2003; Powell & Johnston, 2003; Woodley et al., 2005; Powell et al., 2007; Nilsson et al., 2009),
DCMI community/listserv archives (Bearman, 1997; Dublin Core Metadata Initiative, 2000a,c,b,
2012a,b), and contemporary publications. The objective is not an account of historical events, but
rather an analysis of how some terminology and concepts have been understood, what the liabilities
of those understandings are, and how a clearer, more consistent understanding might be evolved
in order to better support information and access in the 21st century.
3
Conceptual analysis itself is not at all uncommon as a research method in information science,
even though it is not always identified as such. It appears as the dominant method, at least
in its information version, in many of the great classics of library and information science (LIS)
literature. These include works by Patrick Wilson (1968), Michael Buckland (1991, 1997), Biger
Hjørland (1998, 2003, 2005, 2007), Richard Smiraglia (2001), and Elaine Svenonius (2000, 2004).
In an article intended to demonstrate the value of this approach for information studies, Jonathan
Furner (2006) characterizes conceptual analysis in this way:
Conceptual analysis is a technique that treats concepts as classes of objects, events,
properties, or relationships. The technique involves precisely defining the meaning of a
given concept by identifying and specifying the conditions under which any entity or
phenomenon is (or could be) classified under the concept in question. The goal in using
conceptual analysis as a method of inquiry into a given field of interest is to improve
our understanding of the ways in which particular concepts are (or could be) used for
communicating ideas about that field.
My use of conceptual analysis is contextually situated. We are concerned to give an account of
the 1:1 Principle as a development influenced by historical trajectories of the LAM/LIS community
and of computer scientists interested in knowledge-representation problems. Understanding the
connection between these two paradigms provides insight into the various understandings of the
1:1 Principle and an explanation of the role that they play in the development and evolution of
metadata practice and theory. The Dublin Core 1:1 Principle’s conceptualization of relationships
between resources and metadata is at the center of this analysis. However, understanding this
concept quickly leads us to explore related questions about what metadata records are, what it
means for them to describe resources, and how violations of the Principle are conceptualized.
Somewhat surprisingly, there is little prior analytical or historical work on the 1:1 Principle
itself. There are, of course, many references to the Principle in the metadata literature; however,
these are not sustained analytical treatments, but rather informal explanations that are part of
recommending practice (for example, (Caplan, 2003; Hillmann & Westbrooks, 2004; Zeng & Qin,
2008)), or relatively brief accounts that reveal difficulties, confusion, or irritation (Shreeves et al.,
2005; Hutt & Riley, 2005; Park & Childress, 2009; Park, 2009; Miller, 2010). Here, this literature
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functions as a source of evidence, rather than as prior work. As such, it is taken up later in the
course of developing my analysis. Similarly, empirical studies that attempt to identify violations
are also sources of evidence for us and are discussed later as appropriate (Shreeves et al., 2005;
Hutt & Riley, 2005).
1.3 Organization of this Study
1.3.1 Origins of the Dublin Core 1:1 Principle
Chapter 2 explores a fundamental question raised by the presence of the 1:1 Principle in DCMI
documentation: Why did the Dublin Core community find it necessary to articulate the 1:1 Princi-
ple requiring that “related but conceptually different entities, for example a painting and a digital
image of the painting, are described by separate metadata records” (Woodley et al., 2005)? A
review of the literature reveals that libraries, archives, and museums have, in fact, been engaged in
a long struggle to define best practices for representing the relationships between originals, repro-
ductions, and multiple versions of resources within knowledge organization systems—something
that has “proven elusive through all the cataloging codes of the twentieth century” (Knowlton,
2009). Problems and solutions that emerged with the introduction of analog reproduction tech-
nologies—such as microforms, photography, xerography, etc.—to LAM collections extended into
the rapidly expanding digital environment of the World Wide Web (WWW). Although these ap-
proaches conformed with accepted knowledge organization (KO) practices, within the Dublin Core
community they confronted alternative approaches to knowledge representation (KR) that emerged
from the computer science and artificial intelligence communities.
1.3.2 Representation Paradigms
Recognizing that the 1:1 Principle is situated at the intersection of distinct conceptual domains
complicates the objective of providing a clear and coherent operational definition as originally
proposed by Urban (2009). Instead, in Chapter 3 I identify and describe the two paradigms that
frame interpretations of the 1:1 Principle:
knowledge organization paradigm: encompasses traditional library, archive, and museum cat-
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aloging practices based in information retrieval of surrogate representations constructed with
formal syntaxes, but informal semantics.
knowledge representation paradigm: emerged from the needs of the artificial intelligence
community, which needed representation languages built on formal semantics to enable com-
putational intelligent reasoning.
I describe how each paradigm approaches the construction of descriptive representations differ-
ently, each according to its own objectives, fundamental principles, and underlying ontological
commitments. The different views through these lenses inhibit the articulation of a single, coher-
ent conceptual definition of the 1:1 Principle. Articulating the features of each paradigm lays a
foundation for understanding both the confusion about the 1:1 Principle among metadata creators
and the apparent prevalence of violations.
1.3.3 Description and Reference for Cultural Heritage Resources
What does it mean for metadata to be about one, and only one, resource? Although this injunction
appears throughout Dublin Core documentation, in the form of the 1:1 Principle and more strongly
in the formal Dublin Core Abstract Model (Powell et al., 2007), the motivation for this requirement
is not articulated within DCMI. Building on our analysis of representation paradigms in Chapter
3, Chapter 4 demonstrates that the use of descriptions that uniquely refer to a resource is a core
concept of knowledge representation languages, such as the Resource Description Framework. In
contrast, the knowledge organization paradigm uses colloquial bibliographic languages. These allow
the construction of representations that refer to multiple resources or require pragmatic contextual
clues supplied by human readers for successful interpretation. I articulate how these distinctions
between formal and informal approaches to description and reference help explain the observed 1:1
Principle problems in practice.
1.3.4 Revisiting 1:1 Principle Violations
In Chapters 3 and 4, we demonstrated that there is not a single coherent definition of the 1:1
Principle because it can be understood differently from the perspective of the knowledge organiza-
tion and knowledge representation paradigms. Chapter 5 analyzes the heuristics used by metadata
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quality studies that identify 1:1 Principle violations through the lens of each paradigm. I find that,
while useful for certain kinds of quantitative and qualitative analysis, these heuristics are difficult
to formalize into knowledge representation axioms that reliably supply interpretations of colloquial
metadata records.
1.3.5 Contributions & Future Research
This research reveals that the 1:1 Principle, although appearing to be a simple rule with some
problematic definitions, actually has a rich and complex background. Although this work began
with the objective of supplying a single coherent operational definition of the Principle, it instead
revealed the existence of two distinct paradigms for representation languages. Because of the dif-
ferent objectives and fundamental assumptions of each paradigm, multiple interpretations of the
Principle are in operation. While each may be valid from one perspective, considered together
they raise important questions about how research on the Principle should proceed. Because
violations appear to depend as much on the nature of representation languages as on metadata
creators’ behavior, new solutions are needed to move us beyond merely detecting violations. To
solve the problem of ambiguous metadata we need new ways to represent cultural heritage infor-
mation. Knowledge representation languages are one possible solution; but to take full advantage
of their power, cultural heritage professionals must understand the formal models on which they
are based. Preparing cultural heritage professionals to take advantage of the Semantic Web and
Linked Data languages presents challenges for educators and for interface developers. The first
step is to recognize the fundamental paradigm shift that these languages represent.
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Chapter 2
Origins of the Dublin Core 1:1
Principle
The 1:1 Principle: In general, Dublin Core metadata describes one manifestation
or version of a resource, rather than assuming that manifestations stand in for one
another. For instance, a jpeg image of the Mona Lisa has much in common with the
original painting, but it is not the same as the painting. As such the digital image
should be described as itself, most likely with the creator of the digital image included
as a Creator or Contributor, rather than just the painter of the original Mona Lisa. The
relationship between the metadata for the original and the reproduction is part of the
metadata description, and assists the user in determining whether he or she needs to go
to the Louvre for the original, or whether his/her need can be met by a reproduction.
(Hillmann, 2003)
“One to one” is a many-headed snake, and it has bitten us often over the years.
(Weibel, 2010)
2.1 Introduction
The Dublin Core Metadata Initiative standard is a cornerstone for constructing representations
about cultural heritage resources. Built on a foundation of simple principles, Dublin Core is in-
tended to be a lingua franca that facilitates interoperable exchange of information (Baker, 2000;
Hillmann, 2003). An important concept for the Dublin Core language is the 1:1 Principle, “whereby
related but conceptually different entities. . . are described by separate metadata records” (Woodley
et al., 2005). Yet, according to Park & Childress (2009), the metadata creators indicate “a great
deal of confusion” about what the 1:1 Principle is and how it should be applied in the metadata
creation processes. Hutt & Riley (2005), Shreeves et al. (2005), Han et al. (2009), and Miller
8
(2010) suggest that the Principle is routinely ignored or willfully violated in practice, especially for
cultural heritage collections where representations describe both analog and digital resources. It is
puzzling that these violations occur despite recommendations from metadata textbooks (Caplan,
2003; Hillmann & Westbrooks, 2004; Zeng & Qin, 2008), best–practice guidelines (Moen, 1998;
Digital Library Federation & National Science Digital Library, 2007), and original DCMI docu-
mentation (Hillmann, 2003; Woodley et al., 2005; Powell et al., 2007). Publications such as Han
et al. (2009) and Miller (2010) point towards limitations of metadata management systems, and as
Hutt & Riley (2005) observe:
Representing complexities in the OAI DC environment obviously presents a challenge. . . .
This leaves data providers with two choices. Create records that adhere to the 1:1 rule
and omit pertinent information, or violate the rule. We observed many cases in which
data providers chose to violate the rule and combine data about the original intellectual
object as well as its digital manifestation.
What remains unclear from these studies and Dublin Core documentation itself, however, is
why the 1:1 Principle is needed at all. Why is it necessary that Dublin Core metadata is about one,
and only one, resource? Furthermore, the many accounts of the 1:1 Principle present a confusing
picture of which syntactic and semantic structures defined by Dublin Core should be about one,
and only one, resource (i.e., “a metadata?” “a record?” “a description?”). In order to sort through
these confusions, this chapter presents an account of the 1:1 Principle’s origins. My account
draws from knowledge organization (KO) literature about rules for cataloging related resources
such as reproductions, multiple versions, and surrogates for museum objects (e.g., a painting and
a photograph of the painting). I find that within the Dublin Core Metadata Initiative these
traditional practices encounter emerging methods for specifying the formal semantics of knowledge
representation (KR) languages. The 1:1 Principle emerges to communicate a fundamental feature
of KR languages in terms that address the concerns of the KO and cultural heritage community.
Understanding that the 1:1 Principle is thus situated between two paradigms for constructing
representation languages will lead us to explore each in turn in later chapters. The background
developments that resulted in the articulation of the 1:1 Principle will also lead us to revisit our
understanding of what it means to violate it.
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2.2 Description on the Web: Emergence of the Dublin Core
Metadata Initiative
The Dublin Core Metadata Initiative (DCMI) began as the result of informal conversation at the
2nd International World Wide Web Conference in October 1994.1 Struggling with how to address
the explosion of resources on the World Wide Web led the National Center for Supercomputing
Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois and the Online Computer Library Center (OCLC)
to sponsor a Metadata Meeting in March 1995 (Weibel, 1995, 2010). The meeting’s location at
OCLC’s headquarters in Dublin, Ohio provided the name for a new lightweight core vocabulary for
the description of networked “document-like objects” (Weibel, 1995). This vocabulary would enable
document creators to describe their own works without having to use a complex set of cataloging
rules like the Anglo-American Cataloging Rules (AACR2) (American Library Association et al.,
1988). Instead, DCMI adopted several “principles” to guide its development (Weibel, 1995):
1. Intrinsicality: Dublin Core describes the properties of an “item at hand”
2. Extensibility: Dublin Core may be adapted for specialized uses by adding new intrinsic
properties
3. Syntax Independence: Dublin Core does not specify a syntax; rather, an implementer may
select a format appropriate for his/her environment.
At the same time that Dublin Core was getting off the ground, cultural heritage agencies such
as the Research Libraries Group (RLG), the Getty Information Institute (GII), and the Arts and
Humanities Data Service (AHDS) engaged in multiple projects exploring online access to their
members’ materials—especially to reformatted special collections and archival materials (Erway,
1996; Miller & Greenstein, 1997; Fink, 1999). These organizations advocated for cultural organiza-
tions in the discussions about Dublin Core’s future and tested DC’s statement of principles. First,
RLG challenged the notion that Dublin Core was only to be used for online documents, pointing
out that many repositories wished to publish metadata about oﬄine physical materials (Erway,
1996). Second, RLG became a strong proponent of extending DC’s definition of “document-like
1Table 2.1 provides a quick roadmap to developments related to the 1:1 Principle.
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objects” to include images. Initial conversations began at the 3rd Dublin Core “Workshop on Meta-
data for Networked Images” hosted by the Center for Networked Information (CNI) and OCLC
(Cromwell-Kessler & Erway, 1997; Sutton & Miller, 1997).2 But this meeting left an important
issue unresolved—how should Dublin Core records represent digital images that served as surro-
gates for oﬄine physical collections? (Cromwell-Kessler & Erway, 1997; Sutton & Miller, 1997).
A subsequent Metadata Summit meeting sponsored by the Association of Library Collections and
Technical Services (ALCTS) and RLG developed specific recommendations for future Dublin Core
refinements (Research Libraries Group, 1997b). Among the participants’ concerns was the distinc-
tion between non-networked resources and online surrogate representations:
The Dublin Core elements were designed to describe Web documents. Consequently,
they do not distinguish a relationship between object and source since the definitions
of specific Dublin Core elements pertain to the “item” only as it is represented in
its electronic form. The Dublin Core elements DATE, PUBLISHER and SOURCE
are especially problematic. The frequently suggested solution of using the SOURCE
element for all information about the original item is insufficient to resolve the confusion
effectively. Lumping all information about the original into SOURCE will not be helpful
to researchers when they are concerned about the “thing” rather than with the Web
page describing it. (Research Libraries Group, 1997b)
The major outcome of the Task Force on Meta Access workshop was a proposal to extend Dublin
Core in a way that would address this concern:
II. Basic principle and related definitions:
In the strategic Web application of the Dublin Core elements, for the most part, it is
assumed the documents are Internet-accessible original documents. The basic distinc-
tion between the strategic application and the generic application under discussion is
that in the generic application it is important to indicate:
1. if a document is the original or not
2. if a document is Internet-accessible or not
2Also known as The Center for Networked Information (CNI)/OCLC Image Metadata Workshop.
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The nature of the document is defined here as either:
“Original” is used to mean the first manifestation, e.g., a journal published only on the
web or a painting in a museum.
“Surrogate” is used to mean a version that stands for an original – not necessarily an
exact reproduction. A copy on microfilm is an example of a surrogate. This use of the
word includes lesser versions (e.g., thumbnail images) and reformatted versions (e.g., a
digital audio version of an analog recording), but not a part of the whole (e.g., a detail
from a photograph). (Research Libraries Group, 1997a)
Although Dublin Core did not specify a standard syntax, RLG’s proposal also recommended adding
a mechanism to “indicate when neither an original nor a surrogate is Internet-accessible” or “in-
dicate when only a surrogate is being described,” in order to allow indexing systems to include
or ignore different record types (Research Libraries Group, 1997a). The Visual Arts Data Service
(VADS) developed a similar set of recommendations that also included Dublin Core refinements to
describe whether a reproduction was analog or digital (Miller & Greenstein, 1997).
The RLG proposal became a central point of discussion at the 1997 DC-4 Workshop in Helsinki,
Finland. Rather than adopt the proposed changes in the RLG Guidelines (Research Libraries
Group, 1997a), workshop participants discussed the relationship between “logical clusters of meta-
data. . . that reference one, and only one, state of the information resource,” an approach that
became the nucleus of the 1:1 Principle (Weibel & Hakala, 1998; Bearman et al., 1999). The
DCMI community’s response to RLG’s proposal was grounded in work on more formal data mod-
els for Dublin Core that began at the 1996 DC-2 meeting in Warwick, England (Dempsey & Weibel,
1996; Weibel & Hakala, 1998). Under the Warwick Framework, information could be exchanged
through the use of a container architecture that allowed for the representation of discrete metadata
packages (Lagoze, 1996). In part, the Warwick Framework’s architecture would allow packages to
use different standards (e.g., a Dublin Core package and a MARC package) that may semantically
overlap. However, it could also be used to address the problem of packaging descriptions about an
original and its surrogate reproductions. Discussing this problem of these relationships at the 1997
DC-4 meeting, Erik Jul paraphrased Ranganathan’s laws of library science: “to each resource, its
[own] description” (Weibel, 2010).
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The response to RLG’s proposal also represented a tension within the DCMI community be-
tween minimalists, who argued that Dublin Core should provide a simple set of descriptive terms,
and structuralists, who wished to allow Dublin Core to be extended to meet the needs of each partic-
ular application domain (for example, by adding new elements for the cultural heritage community
or by allowing semantic reinterpretation of existing elements) (Weibel et al., 1997). Further defini-
tion of the Principle was delegated to the One-to-One Working Group and the Relation Working
Group, because the relation element was seen as a “logical means” of linking distinct descriptions
of originals and surrogates (Weibel & Hakala, 1998).
2.2.1 Discussion
From this overview, we find that DCMI needed to articulate the 1:1 Principle in part to bridge
the gap between structuralists and minimalists within the community. For the cultural heritage
community, the simplicity of the Dublin Core vocabulary did not allow for the description of related
resources. Between the first discussions about Dublin Core in 1995 and the appearance of the 1:1
Principle in Hillmann (2003), the cultural heritage community organized multiple workshops and
working groups to discuss and inform the development of the Dublin Core standard, as is shown
in Table 2.1. Their solution to this problem was to add additional elements to the standard to
enable users to make more explicit the kind of object being described. For minimalists, these kinds
of extensions only added undesired complexity and inhibited Dublin Core’s interoperability goal.
The minimalist solution to the problem could be found in the emerging container architecture of
the Warwick Framework, where discrete, but related, sets of statements could be organized. This
overview, therefore, explains how an explicit articulation of the 1:1 Principle came to be a part of
the Dublin Core suite of standards. However, the treatment of minimalists and structuralists as
pragmatic camps within DCMI (Weibel et al., 1997) lacks theoretical depth. In order to understand
and assess the 1:1 debate, the following sections explore the precursors to LAM approaches for
describing related resources (originals, reproductions, surrogates, etc.) and the computational
methods that necessitated simple, logical clusters of metadata.
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2.3 Principle Precursors: Cataloging Cultural Heritage
Materials
The cultural heritage community’s concerns about “document-like objects” and the relationships
between “original” and “surrogate” resources within the Dublin Core standards were not new.
Rather, they came after an important period of development that saw existing bibliographic stan-
dards adapted to include non-book materials, such as photographs, graphic materials, audio/visual
resources, museum artifacts, and archival records. These discussions were informed by concerns in
the broader library community about how to represent the plethora of media formats appearing in
collections. These formats ranged from microforms to emerging electronic resources.
2.3.1 Cataloging Reproductions
Early bibliographic cataloging codes were primarily concerned with book-like materials held in
library collections. However, as readily available photomechanical reproduction techniques came
into use (especially the use of microfilm and microfiche in the mid-twentieth century), “confusion
reigned when it came to describing the reproduction” (Knowlton, 2009). Simonton (1962) com-
pleted a survey for the Association of Research Libraries (ARL) in which he proposed two different
approaches to the problem. Each solution recommended that catalogers create a new catalog entry
to represent the reproduction (resulting in two entries—one for the original and one for the repro-
duction), but the approaches differed in what they treated as the object of the description. The
“Facsimile Theory” approach privileged the intellectual content of an item by making the “orig-
inal” resource the focus of the record representing a reproduction. Following the long-standing
practice of “dash entries,” a description of the reproduction itself would be included as a note.
Alternatively, Simonton’s “Edition Theory” required a record to represent the physical features of
the reproduction, using a note to provide a description of the “original” resource (Simonton, 1962;
Graham, 1992). The first edition of the Anglo-American Cataloging Rules (AACR1) (American
Library Association, 1967) incorporated Simonton’s facsimile theory (1962) by requiring a new
entry for a reproduction that described the “original” with a note describing the resource’s status
as a reproduction (Graham, 1992). However, the second edition of the rules, AACR2 (American
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Figure 2.1: Examples of reproduction records from Graham (1992)
Library Association et al., 1988), reversed this decision, requiring that entries for reproductions
adhere to the “edition theory” (see Figure 2.1 an example of each approach). The justification for
this change was AACR2’ s cardinal principle:
The starting point for description is the physical form of the item at hand, not the
original or any previous form in which the work has been published. (American Library
Association, 1967; Graham, 1992)
The cataloging community did not welcome this reversal and “assailed [it] as ‘an obsession with
principle to the exclusion of common sense’” (Graham, 1992). Catalogers felt that the edition
theory prevented entries about reproductions from co-locating with entries about originals in the
catalog, inhibiting the ability of users to find them. Reproductions also possessed features distinct
from those of the original, like place and date of publication. This could confuse patrons and make
it difficult for them to recognize that the reproduction was the resource they sought. The change
also had an economic impact. Under the facsimile theory (AACR1), existing records for original
resources could be cloned easily in electronic bibliographic catalogs. Simply adding a note about
the reproduction is all that would be required. Under the edition theory (AACR2), however, a
cataloger would have to “start over” and create a new entry for the reproduction, adding significant
cost to cataloging procedures (Graham, 1992).
Challenges to the rule change came from several quarters. After studying the problem from var-
ious perspectives, the Library of Congress, the National Library of Medicine, and the Agricultural
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Library (all heavy users of microfilms) rejected the changes. The Library of Congress released a
Rule Interpretation maintaining the facsimile theory approach for LOC cataloging (Graham, 1992;
Library of Congress, 2010). The push to adopt these rules in academic libraries came primarily
from the members of the preservation community who were engaged in projects to transfer brit-
tle books and newspapers onto microfilm. The change in rules meant that significant portions of
funding were being used for re-cataloging efforts rather than converting additional materials. In
response to concerns from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), RLG modified its
cataloging system, the Research Libraries Information Network (RLIN), to allow the use of older
rules for reproductions. In September 1990, the ARL released Guidelines for Bibliographic Records
for Preservation Microfilm Masters. The adoption of these guidelines by LOC, RLG, RLIN, and
OCLC made the facsimile theory the de facto national standard for describing reproductions (As-
sociation of Research Libraries, 1990; Graham, 1992).
The Multiple Versions Problem
While these discussions were under way, a parallel conversation was taking place about how to
handle the multiple versions problem as a proliferation of new media formats entered library col-
lections. The same musical work might be released on a vinyl record or a tape cassette; a film
could appear on 35mm stock, or as a Beta or VHS videotape; a journal could be published in both
print and electronic forms. “The gradual result of all this was proliferation of bibliographic records
for multiple versions of serials, especially in shared cataloging databases, such as OCLC’s. The
content of these records was virtually identical with that of records for the original printed serials,
with access points that were largely redundant across all records” (Jones, 1997).
As with rules for describing microforms, pressure came from the preservation community. The
United States Newspaper Program (USNP) was an NEH project that aimed to create a compre-
hensive national union list of all U.S. newspaper publications and their reproductions.
Multiple versions were endemic in the union list. The USNP found that the needs of its
users were best served by consolidating information for all versions onto a single catalog
record representing the original (even when the original no longer survived). (Jones,
1997)
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Instead of creating multiple records for different physical versions, the USNP used a single
descriptive record and attached information about variants using the standard for “holdings” in-
formation.
While this approach was successful within the USNP, finding broad consensus for the USNP
solution to the multiple versions problem was more elusive. An initial survey conducted by the
Library of Congress Cooperative Serials Program (CONSER) recommended continuing the practice
of creating a new record for each format, but providing links in those records to others for related
forms(Jones, 1997). The Multiple Versions Forum was convened in December 1989 to sort out
the available options. The Forum rejected both consolidated records and the use of separate, but
linked, records. This was based on the limitations of existing bibliographic databases, especially
in the case of shared networks of bibliographic records. Instead, the Guidelines for Bibliographic
Description of Reproductions recommended a “two-tiered hierarchical technique” that mediated
between these approaches (Association of Research Libraries, 1990). Because no record syntaxes
were developed to support this technique, a fractured set of approaches was left in place (Jones,
1997).
Cataloging Electronic Resources
Unfortunately, the precedents set by the treatment of analog reproductions and multiple versions
informed the discussions about how to handle emerging digital formats. Unlike earlier practices,
“once digitized the surrogate of the original is subject to a very different set of cataloging rules. It
is cataloged according to the ‘class’ of materials to which the item belongs, ‘Electronic Resources’ ”
(Copeland, 2002). The Library of Congress extended its earlier rule interpretation for reproductions
(Library of Congress, 2010) to include digital reproductions:
The Prints and Photographs Division regards its digital reproductions, even the high-
resolution images being prepared under the current conversion contracts, as surro-
gates. . . . The records describe the intellectual expression and the original form of
the material and provide a link to the corresponding digital reproductions. Information
about the digital files is not recorded in the MARC bibliographic records since these are
considered surrogates for reference purposes rather than separate works. (Arms, 1999)
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2.3.2 Representing Visual Documentation
The developments in cataloging for reproductions and multiple versions discussed so far mainly
dealt with traditional bibliographic materials such as newspapers, journals, and audio/visual re-
sources in various formats. Independently of this work, librarians, archivists, and curators struggled
with how best to provide access to non-book materials such as photographs, architectural draw-
ings, museum artifacts, and photographic reproductions that depicted such objects. Building on
existing rules for book materials, professionals responsible for these collections began developing
specialized rules for different types of material used in different contexts. One strand of develop-
ment adapted the MARC bibliographic data format for use with visual materials (MARC-VM)
or Archival and Manuscript Control (MARC-AMC). For many communities, newer approaches to
constructing databases and document–markup techniques provided the opportunity to establish
community-specific data standards and content rules. One example of this is the Categories for the
Description of Works of Art (CDWA). In these standards we can see directly the examples that
informed the recommendations found in Guidelines for Extending the Use of Dublin Core Elements
(Research Libraries Group, 1997a).
Cataloging Visual Materials
Cataloging rules for visual materials initially focused on describing original items found in special
collections and archives (Parker & Library of Congress, 1981; Shatford, 1984; White-Hensen & Li-
brary of Congress, 1984). But the growing visual resources movement began developing approaches
for describing secondary sources found in slide libraries used by art historians, architects, and his-
torians. An immediate concern for these efforts was the question of what, exactly, a MARC record
represented and what properties should be represented using the format. Traditionally some of
these concerns had been handled through the creation of physically distinct card catalog systems
that provided context to distinguish between:
• Actual Daguerreotypes
• 35mm slide reproductions of Daguerreotypes
• Books about Daguerreotypes (Dooley & Zinham, 1990)
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The introduction of new genres and formats of materials into cataloging practices, along with the
unifying effect of the MARC format and integrated library systems, resulted in loss of this context.
The structure of MARC itself, based in book cataloging and subject classification, disguised the
distinctions as well. To help restore some of the contextual information afforded by physically
distinct catalogs, MARC-VM and MARC-AMC introduced a control field (006) to indicate “the
type of record.” A brief code list corresponded with different material types:
b Archival and manuscripts control (AMC format only)
g Projected medium
k Two-dimensional non-projectable graphic
o Kit
r Three-dimensional artifact or naturally occurring object
(Evans & Will, 1988)
Types of records were loosely associated with different cooperative cataloging systems, such as
OCLC, RLIN, or other specialized projects such as the Getty Art History Information Program
(AHIP). Within the contexts of these cataloging services, the type of record could also indicate an
association with a set of content rules or best practices for description. In some cases, for example
the RLIN database, records of different types could be treated differently by indexing and retrieval
systems.
The new formats and rules required rethinking the properties available in a MARC record.
Initially MARC only provided a single tag (650) to express “topical, iconographic, genre type or
physical descriptions” which did not allow a record to distinguish a set of drawings from a book about
drawings (Barnett & Petersen, 1990). MARC-VM and MARC-AMC introduced two new fields to
indicate genre type (655 Index Term-Genre/Form) and physical description of the cataloged item
(755 Added Entry-Physical Characteristics). However, “[t]he distinctions between field 655 and
755. . . often remain ambiguous. . . . [W]hen form of material is understood as ‘format’ or ‘type
of object’ the intellectual-physical boundary between fields 655 and 755 disappears” (Dooley &
Zinham, 1990). For example, materials such as scrapbooks, diaries, posters, and broadsides might
be defined as much by their physical characteristics as by their genre.
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This distinction also became important when describing resources that reproduced other re-
sources. For example, a portrait (a genre of image) reproduced on a microfilm would remain a
portrait. However, as a tangible object, what was a Daguerreotype (755 physical characteristics)
now has the characteristics of a microfilm (Dooley & Zinham, 1990). Sorting out the distinctions
between genre and physical formats was the responsibility of controlled vocabularies such as the
Thesaurus for Graphic Materials (TGM) or the Art and Architecture Thesaurus (AAT). However,
different thesauri approached the question of reproductions differently:
The AAT considers reproductions of works of art to be surrogates for original works
and will recommend that they be indexed in a similar fashion. For example, PAINTING
(655) would be used to describe both Leonardo’s Mona Lisa and a slide reproduction;
SLIDE (655) would also be used in the latter case. This holds serious implications for
effective retrieval, as Shatford has warned. In an integrated database containing both
of these media, searchers interested only in examples of actual paintings might have to
learn to exclude slides, microfilm, and other reproduction media in their search queries
to retrieve only records for original paintings. . . . One solution might be the addition of
a “reproduction” facet to indexing strings for object surrogates so that they would be
differentiated from “originals” in a browse display. (Dooley & Zinham, 1990)3
In Dooley & Zinham’s quote (1990) we see almost the same examples and concerns represented
more than ten years later in Hillmann’s account (2003) of the 1:1 Principle. Discussions about
appropriate representations for reproductions and surrogates are frequently concerned with the
information needs of users. Just as advocates of Simonton’s “facsimile theory” noted the usefulness
of collocating its “reproductions” alongside originals represented in the catalog, recommendations
for reproductions and surrogates noted that users were not looking for features of reproductions, but
were looking for “originals.” This was particularly true for slide libraries, where entire collections
consisted of nothing but “reproductions” (Most, 1998). “The question is whether we are cataloging
slides, or the item depicted. We catalog the building shown in the slide, not the photographer of the
building. In 99 percent of the cases, a photographer is not important to the slide librarians or the
3The AAT did include explicit classifications for facsimiles and reproductions; however, it “did not provide a way
to link them with the characteristics of the originals” (Dooley & Zinham, 1990).
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patrons” (Snow, 1990). For Shatford (1984), these use cases meant that rules for cataloging pictorial
works should be based on the objectives of bibliographic catalogs (e.g., Cutter and Lubetsky),
not necessarily on the rules that were derived from them for book cataloging. Shatford (1984)
recommended developing a new set of rules that also more closely examined the entities that were
the focus of subject access and descriptive cataloging. Shatford (1984) explored proposals for both
narrow and broad definitions of “represented works” that would help meet the objectives of the
catalog.4
Visual Documentation of Museum Artifacts
Museums and other non-library cultural organizations that had not yet adopted a standardized
syntax like MARC had the advantage of being able to start with a clean slate. A key part of the
Getty Information Institute’s agenda was to develop a better understanding of the information
needs of humanities scholars who relied on visual resources and artworks for their research.5 This
work reinforced what collection professionals who worked with these scholars already knew—that
consumers of art information had a keen awareness of the differences between the original works
and various analog and digital reproductions that depicted them (Blackwell et al., 1988; Sundt,
2002). Both scholars and general museum users sought items based on the features of original
works depicted by reproductions, not of the reproductions themselves (Spinazze, 2002). Emerging
descriptive format standards, such as the Categories for the Description of Works of Art (CDWA),
explicitly provide distinct sets of properties assigned to either “objects/works” or to “images/visual
documentation” (Harpring & Baca, 2009).
Discussion
In Section 2.2, we learned that the 1:1 Principle emerged out of the needs of cultural heritage insti-
tutions to clearly represent information about both physical and digital resources. Here, we learn
that these concerns did not present themselves because of the new digital environments. Instead,
they are a continuation of a decade of development as libraries, archives, and museums struggled
4I.e., a broad definition would include all copies, reproductions, and derivatives of a visual work whereas a narrow
definition would make all such entities new works in their own right.
5Then known as the Art History Information Project (AHIP).
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to represent the same kinds of relationships using existing bibliographic languages. In most cases,
the specification of rules tended to acknowledge that regardless of the actual state of affairs, users
sought resources based on the properties of the original resource. Rules for bibliographic catalogs
encouraged representations that allowed descriptions of originals and reproductions to collocate
when they shared the same catalog. The context in which a record appeared also provided im-
portant clues to interpreting its meaning. A catalog devoted entirely to reproductions (e.g., in a
slide library) allowed users of records to infer the relationship between originals and reproductions
without making that relationship explicit in the records. In emerging electronic services, devel-
opers felt it was important to preserve these contextual clues by adding elements that explicitly
declared what kind of record followed. This not only communicated information to the user about
the resource being described. It also allowed computer systems to handle records according to their
type.
Because initial drafts of Dublin Core lacked features that had already been introduced in MARC
formats, the cultural heritage community wished to ensure that Dublin Core would reflect those
practices already in place. However, these recommendations were also heavily based in an environ-
ment that relied on fixed document-like syntaxes for records. The approaches to creating metadata
representations at DCMI were moving towards less fixed approaches that allowed for more dynamic
kinds of representations. These approaches were also not new, but were derived from developments
in computer science and artificial intelligence.
2.4 Principle Precursors: Representation Semantics and
Syntaxes
Conversations about “logical clusters of metadata” in Helsinki were informed by developments at
the three previous DC workshops and by discussions in the larger Web metadata community. At
the DC-1 meeting, questions about syntaxes for Dublin Core were intentionally tabled. Partici-
pants feared that a discussion of implementation formats would be premature until the vocabulary
was more established. At the second Dublin Core workshop, held in Warwick, England, delegates
began working out issues related to Dublin Core syntaxes that would enable interoperable exchange
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of descriptions (Dempsey & Weibel, 1996). The recommendations focused on how to embed Dublin
Core elements within HTML documents or as a standalone description using an Standard Gener-
alized Markup Language (SGML) Document Type Definition (DTD). Developers believed that the
standalone SGML approach would afford “explicit semantics of each Dublin Core element”; how-
ever, “discrete packages of metadata cannot be identified and the semantics of repeated elements
are not specified” (Burnard et al., 1996). In order to address the latter problem, the participants at
the workshop emerged with the Warwick Framework, which defined “containers” for “packages” of
metadata (Burnard et al., 1996; Dempsey & Weibel, 1996; Lagoze, 1996). A package might include
Dublin Core metadata, or metadata in other formats.
Metadata is data, no more and no less. . . . A better approach is to consider the informa-
tion architecture as a collection of inter-related resources. While these resources may
have a type, such as PostScript, HTML, or a Java program, this type is orthogonal to
whether the resource is acting as data vs. metadata in some context. That contextual
information is specified by the relationships between the resources. We can model these
inter-related resources using directed graphs, where nodes represent the resources and
the labeled arrows between nodes represent the relationships. Since a resource may be
related to many other resources, nodes may have many arcs originating from or termi-
nating at them. Looking at the direction of an arrow, it is easy to see whether a resource
is playing the role of data or metadata in the context of that particular relationship.
We can easily accommodate such a model by generalizing the Warwick Framework so
that it may contain any resources, not just those considered “metadata”. Thus, we
can use the Warwick Framework Catalog to specify the relationships between various
resources, both inside and outside the container. (Lagoze, 1996)
The Warwick Framework discussions become an influential part of conversations about meta-
data for web resources being developed by the new World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). In
particular, W3C was also addressing technical concerns raised by laws concerned with filtering
adult content on the Internet. One such initiative was the Platform for Internet Content Selection
(PICS) that would embed ratings and content labels into HTML pages. PICS would enable soft-
ware to prevent minors from seeing adult material, or would make assertions about the authority of
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an author. In order to accomplish this, the PICS working group developed several metadata object
models to express the labels assigned to webpages. The PICS Model and Syntax used identifiers
(such as the URL of a web page) to make statements about a resource (Lassila, 1997). Although
designed for content filtering, it was recognized that the general approach recommended by PICS
could be used elsewhere. The development of PICS coincided with the submission of several other
proposals for metadata formats. Microsoft’s XML Web Collections (XMLWC) used a “collection”
of statements to describe a resource. Such collections could be embedded as part of a resource or
use URIs to refer to the resource being described (Hopmann et al., 1997). A similar proposal from
Apple was called the Meta Content Framework (MCF). Created by R.V. Guha, MCF was based on
earlier work on “structure description languages” for the Cyc knowledge base. MCF was intended
to translate the concepts of that research into an application for the Web. As did Lagoze’s sugges-
tion for the Dublin Core Warwick Framework (Lagoze, 1996), MCF based its language model on
directed labeled graphs (DLG) consisting of a set of labels, nodes, and arcs—a triple. MCF also
rejected the distinction between “data” and “metadata,” noting that an object might play different
roles in different situations. Using DLGs meant that MCF could express multiple relationships be-
tween many different kinds of objects—both “data” and “non-data” resources. MCF also provided
a basic set of nodes that would allow designers to specify their own vocabularies and properties.
MCF’s specifications used the new XML standard to represent the structure of the DLGs that
made up a description, rather than the tree-like hierarchy of traditional documents. In order to
organize statements into DLGs, MCF expected “units” to use canonical URIs as unique identifiers,
making them part of a network of nodes and arcs represented by properties, relationships to other
objects, and expressions of values (Guha & Bray, 1997).
Rather than developing each of these recommendations separately, the W3C rolled them to-
gether into a new initiative known as the Resource Description Framework (RDF). RDF was not
based on any single technology. Rather, it borrowed from XMLWC, MCF, and the Dublin Core
Warwick Framework (Miller, 1998). RDF’s emergence was also tightly tied to the new eXtensible
Markup Language (XML) specification that aimed to provide a bridge between the complexities of
the Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML) and HyperText Markup Language (HTML).
“By exploiting the features of XML, RDF imposes structure that provides for the unambiguous ex-
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pression of semantics, and, as such, enables consistent encoding, exchange, and machine-processing
of standardized metadata” (Miller, 1998). The development of the RDF specifications encouraged
DCMI to begin work on providing a more formal data model for Dublin Core (Weibel & Hakala,
1998; Weibel, 2010).6
2.5 A Principle in Practice: Developing Implementation
Guidelines for the 1:1 Principle
Following the Helsinki meeting, the two working groups (One-to-One and Relations) set to work.
The discussions were frequently contentious debates between members in different camps. For
cultural heritage participants, the issues with the 1:1 Principle were primarily questions about
the kinds of resources that could be described using Dublin Core. Drawing on their experiences
with previous standardization efforts, this camp felt it necessary to provide guidance. However,
there was a strong resistance to Dublin Core getting into the cataloging rules business. The
members of this opposing camp preferred to let Dublin Core remain a simple standard for resource
discovery. Acknowledging the concerns of cultural heritage professionals, they argued that the
kind of discrimination they sought could be handled by more robust local standards (Miller &
Greenstein, 1997). Furthermore, discussions on the one-to-one listserv:
. . . made absolutely clear that there is no consensus on what 1:1 really means in practice.
In the end, people will describe what *they* want to describe, for their purposes and
the purposes of their user community. That means they may describe a TIFF of an
Ansel Adams photograph as having been created by Ansel Adams. Who’s to say they’re
wrong? (Wendler, 1999)
By the end of 1999, this online discussion dwindled. The group was formally disbanded at the 2000
DC Workshop without having reached a clear consensus or definition of the Principle.
At the time of these discussions, Dublin Core still had not published any definitive guidelines
for encoding syntaxes. Assumptions about what the 1:1 Principle applied to were largely based on
assumptions about what a record was. Among the suggestions for how to handle the 1:1 Principle
6This would ultimately result in the DCMI Abstract Model (DCAM).
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was the concept that a “record” might consist of different logical packages of information, each of
which described a different related resource (for example, see Figure 2.2 from Weinheimer (1999)).
<set 1>
<Title=Mona Lisa>
<Format=oil painting>
<Creator=Leonardo da Vinci>
</set 1>
<set 2>
<Title=Photo of Mona Lisa>
<Format=35 mm>
<Creator=Stan>
</set 2>
<set 3>
<Title=Digitized image of Mona Lisa>
<Format=jpeg>
<Creator=Joe>
</set 3>
Figure 2.2: Example of “logical clusters” of metadata from Weinheimer (1999)
Discussions in the Relation Working group focused more on developing “logical clusters” of
metadata that could be linked together. The discussions echoed concerns aired in regard to earlier
MARC-based solutions to representing the related “facets” of originals and reproductions. In
particular, there were concerns that separate “records” for an original or a reproduction could
be separated, resulting in a loss of information. The suggestion of separate records also raised
concerns about how such records would be displayed to the user, with a sense that independent
representations of “originals” and “reproductions” would make the task harder. Proponents of
“keeping Dublin Core simple” suggested that the use of atomic statements about resources could
enable better discovery of resources without the additional complexity being suggested by models
that identified resource types. Instead, statements about resources could be dynamically organized
into logical packages for particular uses such as retrieval or display for a user (Lagoze, 1997, 2001a).
One method that offered promise was the emerging RDF semantic model.
As noted above, the emergence of RDF as a parallel set of developments to Dublin Core spurred
DCMI to begin thinking about a data model for representing Dublin Core metadata. Initially
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the development focused on expressing Dublin Core as a variant of RDF. However, within the
implementer community, there was a great deal of initial resistance to RDF in favor of simpler
“plain” XML representations. This was due in part to a lack of practice and of software tools that
could understand RDF. Because the XML serialization of RDF represented a graph structure, it
was also less human-readable than straightforward encoding of records consisting of element/value
pairs. Push back against RDF came from the Open Archives Initiative (OAI) community, which
was developing a protocol for exchanging “packages” of metadata along the lines of the Warwick
Framework. The lack of broad uptake of RDF was of particular concern for the OAI developers.
“It may be that the vast majority of data providers don’t need (or even understand) RDF and are
mainly interested in exposing metadata as simple attribute-value pairs or simple trees for which
XML is perfectly appropriate” (Lagoze, 2001b). In order to conform both to the simple Dublin
Core model and to provide a low barrier to use (i.e., by using well-supported technologies), the OAI
community adopted a simple Dublin Core XML schema as a required part of the protocol (Lagoze
et al., 2008). Initially this schema was developed as one of many approaches to specifying Dublin
Core. This multiplicity was possible because there were no formal recommendations from DCMI.
In a variety of ways, DCMI addressed calls for greater guidance for implementing Dublin Core.
In 2001, DCMI released official guidance for encoding Dublin Core in XML. This included rudimen-
tary definitions of an abstract model that specified a one-to-one relationship between a record and
a resource (Powell & Johnston, 2002).7 Using Dublin Core provided an informative introduction to
both metadata and Dublin Core specifically. Although early drafts of this document do not refer
to the 1:1 Principle, it did appear in the 2003 version (Hillmann, 2003). Hillmann’s account offers
7This definition would mature into the separate specification for the Dublin Core Abstract Model (Powell et al.,
2007). The DCAM provides a clearer specification of how the 1:1 Principle could have be implemented by Open
Archives Initiative Protocol for Metadata Harvesting (OAI-PMH).
A description is made up of one or more statements (about one, and only one, resource) and zero or
one resource URI (a URI reference that identifies the resource being described). . . . This is commonly
referred to as the 1:1 Principle.
However, real-world metadata applications tend to be based on loosely grouped sets of descriptions
(where the described resources are typically related in some way), known here as description sets. For
example, a description set might comprise descriptions of both a painting and the artist. Furthermore,
it is often the case that a description set will also contain a description about the description set itself
(sometimes referred to as “admin metadata” or “meta-metadata”).
Description sets are instantiated, for the purposes of exchange between software applications, in the
form of metadata records, according to one of the DCMI encoding guidelines (XHTML meta tags, XML,
RDF/XML, etc.) (Powell et al., 2007).
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general guidance about the 1:1 Principle through the example of the Mona Lisa and a surrogate
image of the famous painting in a way that closely follows Dooley & Zinham’s example (1990).
In regard to recommendations, however, DCMI was not in a position to enforce any particular
approach to implementing Dublin Core. Each community that adopted it found their own solutions
to the problems at hand, often using practical workarounds to solve problems. For example, the
Consortium for the Computer Interchange of Museum Information (CIMI) project constructed a
Dublin Core testbed and found:
The element set is not effective for discovery of complex, museum information. Attempts
to extend the DCMES using Semantic Refinements resulted in violation of both the
1:1 and dumb-down principles. There is a tension between the type of information
that museums are used to sharing and the fundamental principles of the Dublin Core.
(Spinazze, 2000)
2.6 Conclusion
The developers of Dublin Core intended it to be a simple vocabulary that could be broadly applied
to emerging Internet resources. The introduction of cultural heritage material also introduced
more complex kinds of relationships between online and oﬄine resources or “originals” and “re-
productions.” Faced with this problem, the cultural heritage community proposed solutions based
on many years of practice using document surrogates in information retrieval systems. Human-
understandable cataloging rules made such documents meaningful for both metadata creators and
users. However, users of traditional cataloging systems also struggled with defining best practices
for describing reproductions and multiple versions. Conflicting interpretations meant that docu-
ment surrogates could appear in two forms based on the object of description (i.e., facsimile/edition
theory approaches). Within the Dublin Core Metadata Initiative, these developments in descriptive
cataloging encountered new approaches to representing descriptions as “metadata.” While emerg-
ing technologies such as XML enabled the creation of document-like data models, the development
of Dublin Core was also influenced by more formal modeling techniques that required a one-to-one
relationship between entities and their descriptions. Because this requirement conflicted with the
cultural heritage community’s recommendations for handling reproductions, it was necessary to
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articulate it in DCMI documentation as the 1:1 Principle.
Unfortunately, what lies behind the 1:1 Principle are fundamentally different approaches to
description. The conversations and debates that led up to the 1:1 Principle tended to obscure the
theoretical differences between these approaches in the course of working towards pragmatic con-
sensus. In order to further understand the 1:1 Principle, Chapter 3, Representation Paradigms, will
examine these differences through the lens of two representation paradigms: knowledge organization
and knowledge representation. In Chapter 4, Description and Reference for Cultural Heritage, I
examine the methods used by each paradigm to establish a relationship between described entities
and their representations. In Chapter 5, Revisiting 1:1 Principle Violations, these observations
lead me to question how metadata quality research has characterized 1:1 Principle errors and their
detection.
30
Chapter 3
Representation Paradigms
The representation of knowledge in symbolic form is a matter that has preoccupied
the world of documentation since its origin. . . . The structure of records and files in
databases; data structures in computer programming; the syntactic and semantic struc-
ture of natural language; knowledge representation in artificial intelligence; models of
human memory: in all these fields it is necessary to decide how knowledge may be
represented so that the representation may be manipulated. (Vickery, 1986)
The ability of a system to solve the problems for which it was designed is strongly
influenced by the choice of representation. (Smith, 1980)
3.1 Introduction
Baker (2000) describes Dublin Core as “a small language for making a particular class of statements
about resources.” In his view, Dublin Core is a pidgin language intended to serve as a lingua franca
for the exchange of information about resources in a “linguistically diverse” Internet commons.
As with any language, common rules of grammar allow speakers and listeners to construct and
understand what is expressed using Dublin Core. The 1:1 Principle seems to be exactly the
kind of grammatical rule needed for clear communication, yet the available evidence suggests that
metadata creators frequently have ignored it. What explains this apparent disconnect between
Dublin Core recommendations and practice?
Park & Childress (2009) and Urban (2009) suggest that confusions related to the 1:1 Principle
may arise because the concepts that the Principle embodies have not been clearly stated in avail-
able Dublin Core documentation. This lack of clarity has resulted in confusion among metadata
creators tasked with conforming to the Principle. Urban’s suggestion (2009), then, was to provide
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an improved conceptual definition of the Principle that might help alleviate this confusion and also
serve as a basis for assessing metadata quality. However, in Chapter 2, we found that the Principle
emerged from discussions among members of the Dublin Core community with diverse perspec-
tives about the fundamentals of Dublin Core’s grammar. If we are to articulate a clear, coherent
definition of the 1:1 Principle, in which of these perspectives should it be grounded? Finally, how
can paradigms illuminate our understanding of 1:1 Principle violations?
This chapter serves as a foundation for answering these questions by introducing two represen-
tation language paradigms:
• The Knowledge Representation Paradigm uses knowledge representations that express propo-
sitional statements using formal semantics for automated reasoning. (artificial intelligence,
ontology, formal semantics, Semantic Web)
• The Knowledge Organization Paradigm uses document surrogates/records that represent fea-
tures of documents optimized for relevant retrieval and organization in closed information
retrieval systems. (bibliographic classification, information retrieval, colloquial syntax)
While each of these paradigms is based on the practices of particular communities, it is unclear
from the available evidence whether they can be associated with specific actors involved with DCMI
specifications. Weibel et al. (1997) noted the emergence of structuralists and minimalists during
debates at DC-4, with the following caution:
It is an oversimplification to suggest that these two groups are distinct and mutually
exclusive; in fact, they are two poles of a continuum, and conferees were distributed
throughout this continuum.
I believe the same caution holds here. The goal of this chapter, then, is to introduce the paradigms
as a conceptual and analytic lens through which we can understand how each paradigm goes
about the task of constructing representations. As such, this chapter is grounded in the technical
specifications and research literature associated with each paradigm, not the attitudes or beliefs of
metadata creators themselves (as represented by Park & Childress (2009)).
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3.1.1 The Concept of a Paradigm
The concept of scientific paradigms was introduced by Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1970) as a way to understand how scientific theory advances. In Kuhn’s approach, a
scientific paradigm shapes how scientists think about the research problems they address in their
work and prompts new questions when those modes of thinking encounter anomalies. Tjo¨rnebohm
(1974), as translated by Hjørland (2003), presents the following attributes of paradigms:
• ideals and beliefs about science, such as epistemic goals, methods, and criteria in the produc-
tion and evaluation of scientific results inside the discipline;
• world view hypotheses, including basic social ontological assumptions about the part of the
world studied inside the discipline, and;
• ideals concerning the extra-scientific significance of knowledge produced inside the discipline,
such as significance for society and culture, for practical use, and for enlightenment.
Although Kuhn’s original conceptualization of paradigms was directed at scientific paradigms,
the concept has been usefully applied elsewhere, including the social sciences. Here, the kinds of
features that are the basis of Kuhn’s criteria are useful for teasing out confusions around the 1:1
Principle and sharpening the distinctions that appear in its evolution, as found in Chapter 2.
Representation Paradigms
Kuhn’s conceptualization of paradigms has been especially useful for understanding the internal
divisions of research within the library and information science community (Brown, 1987; Miksa,
1991; Bates, 1999; Hjørland, 2000, 2003, 2005) and the artificial intelligence (AI) community (i.e.,
“scruffy” vs. “neat” approaches) (Halpin, 2004).
For the most part, however, these uses of paradigms have focused inwardly on different ap-
proaches to a common research agenda. In this way, they may be more closely tied to Kuhn’s
conceptualization of paradigms as part of scientific progress. Through these discussions we can see
the evolution and branching of research within each of these disciplinary areas. However, as Smith
(1976) suggests, there is also value in importing concepts across disciplinary paradigms as a way
to ask new questions within one’s own domain. While Smith (1976) did this for early artificial
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intelligence research, conversations around the Dublin Core 1:1 Principle suggest that a similar
comparison is needed for contemporary representation languages.
In order to outline how knowledge representation and knowledge organization operate as dis-
tinct paradigms, this chapter builds on Tjo¨rnebohm’s characterization (1974) of Kuhn’s paradigms
and definitional criteria of representation languages (drawing from definitions of knowledge rep-
resentation in Davis et al. (1993) and Sowa (2000), and description of bibliographic languages in
Svenonius (2000)). For both knowledge representation and knowledge organization, I present the
following paradigm-defining criteria:
• The objectives and principles of representation languages;
• The methods used by each paradigm to achieve stated objectives;
• The ontological commitments inherent in those objectives, principles, and methods;
• The significance of each paradigm for the Dublin Core 1:1 Principle.
3.2 Knowledge Representation
3.2.1 Overview
The knowledge representation paradigm emerged from the research and design of artificial intel-
ligence (AI) systems in the 1970s and 1980s. Although the field is most closely associated with
computer science, it traces its ancestors to the earliest methods of systematically reasoning about
the world around us (Davis et al., 1993; Sowa, 2000; Halpin, 2004). “Over the long time after
Aristotle, logicians such as Frege, Russell, Leibniz, Go¨del, Tarski and others have fully developed
formal logic systems such as propositional logic and predicate logic, which formalize the thinking
and reasoning process of humans” (Chen, 2010). Broadly, artificial intelligence research focuses on
a series of problems related to pattern recognition, machine learning, problem solving, and especially
relevant to this discussion, representation (Smith, 1976, 1980). Although not all of AI’s agenda
has been achieved, the research has benefited applications in medicine, bioscience, and machine
translation. This research also has enabled large-scale search and retrieval on the World Wide Web.
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Google, Yahoo! and other tools use related techniques for knowledge extraction, indexing, neural
networks, and genetic algorithms for organizing the Web (Chen, 2010).
Within AI, the field of knowledge representation emerged to develop formalizations of knowledge
needed for intelligent reasoning. Early representation languages for artificial intelligence systems
matured into Semantic Web languages, such as the Resource Description Framework (RDF). RDF
is directly descended from large-scale knowledge base projects, like Cyc, that attempted to repre-
sent “common-sense” knowledge needed for reasoning (Halpin, 2004). Such representations rely not
just on syntaxes They also use formalized interpretations of theories of description and reference.
Because of a core concern with description, the RDF community has influenced (and been influ-
enced by) the Dublin Core community, as can be seen in recommendations such as the Warwick
Framework, the DCMI Abstract Model, and specific syntax guidelines for Dublin Core.
3.2.2 Objective of Relevant Reasoning
According to Davis et al. (1993), knowledge representations operate within a “theory of intelligent
reasoning” that specifies what counts as reasoning, what inferences are licensed by the theory, and
what other inferences it recommends. For many knowledge representation languages this leads to a
formal semantics that corresponds to First-order Logic (FOL) (Sowa, 2000). Statements that rely
on formal semantics excel at expressing declarative sentences that can be assigned a truth value
(true/false) and can be modeled by formal interpretations.
For example, RDF adopts model-theory to specify its representation language semantics. A
precise mathematical theory allows the language to represent an interpretation of a world by:
. . . describing the minimal conditions that a world must satisfy in order to assign an
appropriate meaning for every expression in the language. . . . The chief utility of a
formal semantic theory is not to provide any deep analysis of the nature of the things
being described by the language or to suggest any particular processing model, but
rather to provide a technical way to determine when inference processes are valid, i.e.,
when they preserve truth. This provides the maximal freedom for implementations
while preserving a globally coherent notion of meaning.” (Hayes, 2004)
Another way to understand such a model is that it is the designer who provides his or her inter-
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pretation of what true statements can be made about some world. When a statement is expressed
using these kinds of semantics, it says something true about something that exists in the model
of the world. How well the interpretation of the world corresponds to the “real world” is part
of the design challenge. However, a reasoning system using the model remains ignorant of this
correspondence. It can only reason about what it knows.
The meaning of a knowledge base derives from features and relationships that are
common to all possible models. If, for example, the interpretation of a class must
always be the empty set, then that class is said to be inconsistent, while if there are
no possible interpretations, the knowledge base itself is said to be inconsistent. If the
relationship specified by a given axiom must hold in all interpretations of a knowledge
base, then that axiom is said to be entailed by the knowledge base, and if one knowledge
base entails every axiom in another knowledge base, then the first knowledge base is
said to entail the second knowledge base. (Horrocks et al., 2003)
In other words, a knowledge representation environment supplies representations with a formal
semantics that enables reasoning systems to understand the meaning of propositional statements to
a degree that is sufficient to derive inferences from them. KR does not supply broader understanding
of “semantics” as representations that are meaningful for human consumption and reasoning.
Principles of Knowledge Representation
As the focus of this study is on the 1:1 Principle, it is also helpful here to consider the principles each
paradigm uses. This begs the question: “what are principles and how do they help us understand
representation languages?” In answering this question, we find that there are, in fact, different
senses of the term “principle” that are also helpful in thinking about each paradigm. Consider:
principle: A fundamental truth or proposition on which others depend; a primary assumption
forming the basis of a chain of reasoning. (Oxford English Dictionary, 2011)
principle: A general law or rule adopted or professed as a guide to action; a settled ground or
basis of conduct or practice; a fundamental motive or reason for action, esp. one consciously
recognized and followed. (Oxford English Dictionary, 2011)
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In pursuit of the objectives above, knowledge representations are built on the fundamental
principles (i.e., fundamental propositions) of logical reasoning as represented by predicate logic. In
developing models for reasoning, then, a fundamental concept like “representations are about one,
and only one, resource” can be seen as an essential proposition of a KR model. Any reasoning
that takes place within a model that has adopted this as a principle will depend on its truth
to evaluate the mathematical truth of other statements. It is not a principle that can be set
aside to accommodate a particular contextual situation, although different interpretations may be
constructed where a different fundamental principle applies.
This is not to suggest that the second sense of principle has no role in KR. Similar principles of
guidance inform the translation of natural language sentences into a formal representation.1 These
translations often favor “naturalness” and simplicity over the complexities of other possible trans-
lations. Likewise, principles of guidance can help developers of an ontology represent the messiness
of the real world in a functional model by suggesting appropriate simplifications. However, in most
cases these guiding principles stand outside of the formal system and precede any formal reason-
ing tasks. In an RDF-like environment, once statements and interpretations are established, only
principles of reasoning act to determine their validity within a model.
3.2.3 Knowledge Representation Methods
In order for knowledge representation to achieve these objectives, it seeks to provide methods for
encoding knowledge in ways that support computational reasoning.
At the root of any KR language is the specification of the logical rules that form the basis of the
reasoning system. For many KR languages, these rules are based on some fragment of first-order
logic that enables reasoning to be both completable and efficient. This set of rules will specify the
primitive entities that will serve as the building blocks for an interpretation that represents some
domain of discourse. At a basic level, the rules specify the fundamental components of propositional
statements (i.e., the RDF concepts of subject, predicate, and object, or more complex statements)
and the ability to designate other classes. The Resource Description Framework (RDF) is an
example of this kind of KR language. Its basic mathematical rules of logic are specified by a
1Thanks to Karen M. Wickett for this example.
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model-theoretic approach to semantics (Hayes, 2004; Halpin, 2009).
An important feature of KR languages is the need to specify a primitive entity that functions
in a way that is equivalent to how proper names function in natural language. These entities
perform an important function in KR languages as logical constants that allow reasoning systems
to recognize when propositions are referring to the same entity. Early KR systems relied on simple
terms for this purpose. While this worked well within locally controlled systems where names
could be carefully managed, researchers found that this approach caused confusions when different
knowledge bases were merged together. To solve this problem for the Internet, RDF uses Uniform
Resource Identifiers (URIs) that can be used to refer unambiguously to the subjects of propositions
and the concepts that serve as predicates (Hayes, 2004; Halpin, 2009).
Having provided the principle rules for reasoning and primitive representation concepts, it
is necessary to specify the entities needed by an application domain. At the root level, most
KR languages have a primitive concept of “things” or “resources” that is sufficiently general to
encompass both concrete and abstract entities as objects of reasoning. For some domains, however,
it is necessary to formalize our conceptualization of the world by supplying an ontology. An ontology
not only allows us to indicate what kinds of things are included, but also what properties should
be associated with each ontological kind. That is, an ontology may also include a specification of
the vocabulary a particular reasoning system will use to express propositions about formal classes.
So far what we have been discussing are abstract constructs that are not associated with any
concrete approach to encoding representations within a computational system. Because KR lan-
guages are firmly grounded in these abstract concepts, it is possible to use multiple approaches
to constructing, storing, and manipulating representations that conform to a particular interpre-
tation. A KR language, therefore, may be used with a variety of data models provided that they
accurately represent the basic structures of the language and that the syntax has been mapped to
the interpretation.
Because the ultimate objective is intelligent reasoning, the last part of any KR system is the
ability to specify reasoning tasks that will be applied to representation instances. Again, languages
like RDF provide a basic set of rules (i.e., logical entailment) that can bootstrap more complex
reasoning tasks. The capabilities of reasoning, however, are always constrained by the expressivity
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of a particular language.
Thus a fully semantic language system requires not only syntactic representations of proposi-
tional content, but also a specification of an interpretation that provides statements with formal
meanings. Such interpretations do have some correspondence to “a state-of-affairs in a world”
(Hayes, 2004), but the interpretation may simplify or distort the world in the service of particular
reasoning tasks. The form that knowledge representations take is not accidental. Rather, it is
closely tied to a holistic reasoning system. Changing the features of a knowledge representation
syntax requires making corresponding changes to the semantic model on which it is based.
3.2.4 Knowledge Representation Ontological Commitments
An important part of Kuhn’s paradigms is “world view hypotheses, including basic social ontological
assumptions about the part of the world studied inside the discipline” (Tjo¨rnebohm, 1974; Hjørland,
2000). As noted above, contemporary knowledge representation languages, such as RDF, have made
strong commitments to the fundamental principles of predicate logic and interpretations based in
model-theory. Such commitments entail other requirements of knowledge representation languages.
For example, predicate logic mainly deals with declarative propositions that can be assigned a truth
value (true/false). It does not handle other kinds of knowledge (modal statements, questions,
commands, belief, etc.) well.
In order to achieve reasoning objectives, certain computational constraints also affect what kinds
of expressions are allowable in a KR language. For example, when specifying the fundamental logical
rules for an interpretation, most KR languages only allow conjunction of propositions (this AND
that). Disjunctive statements (this OR that) have proven to increase problems with the completion
and decidability of reasoning. Likewise, most KR environments do not allow statements of negation
(NOT). The limitations on disjunction and negation mean that the formalizations of KR languages
frequently treat any statements within a knowledge base as functionally true statements.2
As noted above, the semantics of RDF seek to be “metaphysically and ontologically neutral”
(Hayes, 2004) with regard to the entities we reason about, beyond the requirement that some entity
2This is not to say that statements, due to their lack of correspondence to some state of affairs, cannot be
considered false. However, within an interpretation, any statements considered to be a model of the interpretation
are treated as true.
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has identity and can be supplied with a name. However, based on the desired reasoning tasks, the
use of KR language does require accepting the constraints of the language in addition to making
further ontological commitments to represent a domain:
If, as we have argued, all representations are imperfect approximations to reality, each
approximation attending to some things and ignoring others, then in selecting any
representation we are in the very same act unavoidably making a set of decisions about
how and what to see in the world. That is, selecting a representation means making a
set of ontological commitments. The commitments are in effect a strong pair of glasses
that determine what we can see, bringing some part of the world into sharp focus, at
the expense of blurring other parts.
These commitments and their focusing/blurring effect are not an incidental side effect
of a representation choice; they are of the essence: a KR is a set of ontological commit-
ments. It is unavoidably so because of the inevitable imperfections of representations.
It is usefully so because judicious selection of commitments provides the opportunity to
focus attention on aspects of the world we believe to be relevant. (Davis et al., 1993)
3.2.5 Significance for the 1:1 Principle
Because of the formal semantics adopted by knowledge representation languages, anything that
is considered to be a statement is, by definition, about one and only one thing. In addition, the
use of a formal theory of reference, one that uses names as constants in a statement, means that
any set of statements that uses the same name also describes one and only one thing. Within an
interpretation, it is not possible to create a set of statements that isn’t about one and only one
thing. Representations that are a model of an interpretation, therefore, cannot violate a rule such
as the 1:1 Principle. This, however, does not mean that such representations would remain valid
if provided different interpretations that used the same representations. In Chapter 4, we will take
a closer look at how formal theories of description and reference work, and in Chapter 5 we will
consider how they may lead to problems of reference different from those that have been identified
by existing studies of the 1:1 Principle.
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3.3 Knowledge Organization
3.3.1 Overview
Knowledge organization is an interdisciplinary area of work within the field of library and infor-
mation science. The knowledge organization paradigm is broadly concerned with the description,
arrangement, and classification of “information-bearing messages in recorded form” (Svenonius,
2000).3 For the purposes of this comparison, we are interested in the development of traditional
bibliographic catalogs, rule systems, and document surrogates, such as MARC or Dublin Core XML
records, and associated information retrieval systems. My treatment of the knowledge organiza-
tion paradigm is informed by Elaine Svenonius’s work The Intellectual Foundation of Information
Organization (2000), as well as Biger Hjørland’s numerous articles on the epistemological and
philosophical foundations of knowledge organization (Hjørland, 1998, 2003, 2007).
The knowledge organization paradigm has played a significant role in the development and
deployment of Dublin Core. As noted in Chapter 1, concerns about the use of Dublin Core repre-
sentations for cultural heritage collections initially emerged from the library community. These con-
cerns were informed by the fundamental objectives, principles, and rules for defining bibliographic
representation languages, manifested as the Paris Principles, the Anglo-American Cataloging Rules
(AACR), MAchine Readable Cataloging (MARC), and Dublin Core XML schemas used by the
Open Archives Initiative Protocol for Metadata Harvesting (OAI-PMH).
3.3.2 Objective of Relevant Retrieval
The knowledge organization paradigm specifies four primary objectives for bibliographic languages
(IFLA Study Group on the Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records, 2009):
1. using the data to find materials that correspond to the user’s stated search criteria (e.g., in
the context of a search for all documents on a given subject, or a search for a recording issued
under a particular title);
3I use knowledge organization here, understanding that there is some terminological confusion with information
organization. Information organization may be understood as having a broader set of concerns related to “infor-
mation” rather than “knowledge”; however, these terms are frequently used interchangeably in the LIS literature.
There are also divisions within the community regarding what the proper concerns for information organization vs.
knowledge organization should be. I use knowledge organization here without fixed connection to a single community
of practice.
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2. using the data retrieved to identify an entity (e.g., to confirm that the document described
in a record corresponds to the document sought by the user, or to distinguish between two
texts or recordings that have the same title);
3. using the data to select an entity that is appropriate to the user’s needs (e.g., to select a
text in a language the user understands, or to choose a version of a computer program that
is compatible with the hardware and operating system available to the user);
4. using the data in order to acquire or obtain access to the entity described (e.g., to place
a purchase order for a publication, to submit a request for the loan of a copy of a book in a
library’s collection, or to access online an electronic document stored on a remote computer).
The objectives of the IFLA Study Group on the Functional Requirements for Bibliographic
Records (2009) are very closely tied to knowledge-organization research on user information-seeking
tasks. The dominance of the MARC format in library information retrieval systems has focused
attention on document surrogates that bear some relationship to the documents that they represent,
but this relationship has not been grounded in a formal semantic theory. Formal approaches
in knowledge organization have, instead, focused on developing operational definitions of user
tasks that are “formulated in such as way that their achievement (or non-achievement) can be
ascertained” (Svenonius, 2000). For example, a fundamental understanding of the find objective
is represented by defining relevance as the measurement of recall (how many representations are
retrieved) and precision (the representations retrieved meet the user’s need).
Knowledge Organization Principles
Complementing the objectives of knowledge organization systems is a broad spectrum of biblio-
graphic principles. According to Lubetsky, principles establish the “cardinal points” by which to
navigate in the production of bibliographic entries in a catalog (cited in Svenonius 2000). These
principles are organized into a loose hierarchy of importance, in which certain principles may be
considered to override other principles. At the pinnacle of this hierarchy is the Principle of User
Convenience, which frequently overrides such others as the Principle of Accuracy.
In light of our earlier observation of two senses of “principles,” we may consider bibliographic
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principles to be principles of guidance:
principle: A general law or rule adopted or professed as a guide to action; a settled
ground or basis of conduct or practice; a fundamental motive or reason for action,
esp. one consciously recognized and followed. (Oxford English Dictionary, 2011)
However, because such principles do not logically follow from one another, “it is recognized that
these principles may contradict each other in specific situations and a defensible, practical solu-
tion should be taken” (Tillett & Christan, 2009). Svenonius (2000) attempts to provide a neat
analysis of contemporary bibliographic principles to demonstrate that they form an important link
between objectives and individual cataloging rules. However, Spanhoff (2002) finds that rules do
not necessarily proceed logically from principles and objectives. “The rules were drawn up based,
not on theory, but upon practices already fixed by usage. . . . [S]ystematizing and coordinating the
rules. . . has resulted in bringing to light a few principles” (Pettee, 1985). The decision to promote
one principle over another is part of the subjective judgement of an individual cataloger (or shared
local conventions), who is able to assess local information needs and contexts.
The implications of this approach to principles can be seen in the debates around how to
treat reproductions in current cataloging rules. In general, AACR2 rules specify that the object
of description should be the item itself—that is, that one should describe a reproduction as a
reproduction. But because of concerns about user needs (and economics of cataloging production),
the practice in many cultural heritage environments is to describe the original, with a note specifying
the resource’s status as a reproduction. Again, local decisions about user needs may dictate which
approach is taken. Unfortunately this may lead to later ontological confusion when attempting to
interpret an individual representation. “As yet the input standards themselves are not standardized,
so that what is recognized as the object of description by one agency may not be so recognized by
another” (Svenonius, 2000).
3.3.3 Knowledge Organization Methods
Knowledge organization has built up a large body of practice regarding the organization of infor-
mation. This body of practice supplies a variety of methods. At the forefront of these developments
has been the specification of user tasks, which catalog systems are intended to address as described
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above. The specification of methods to achieve those objectives, in Svenonius’s view (2000), is
further refined through the application of bibliographic principles.
These objectives and principles inform the creation of a set of rules that guide the production
of bibliographic entries. Such rules are intended to be interpreted by human agents who examine a
document and extract from it the relevant features that the document’s surrogate needs to represent.
For bibliographic materials, the core set of rules is defined by the Anglo-American Cataloging Rules
(American Library Association et al., 1988). However, a variety of related rule sets also exist. Which
rules are applied to create a specific description may depend on the genre and format of materials
being described, the nature of the collecting institution (i.e., public library or academic library), or
the technical environment in play (variation among rules by cataloging service). Specific domains
have also adopted the rule-based approach of AACR2 to produce guidelines that are parallel
with, or extend, AACR2. For example, the museum and visual resources communities developed
Cataloging Cultural Objects (Baca et al., 2006) and archives use Describing Archives: A Content
Standard (Society of American Archivists & Hensen, 2004).
From the perspective of knowledge organization professionals, these rule systems provide a
kind of semantics that make bibliographic entities meaningful. However, according to Hjørland
(2007), information science “has not yet addressed semantics in a systematic fashion,” leaving
the field “very fragmented and without a proper theoretical basis.” Where work has been done,
it has largely focused on the meaning of classification systems and thesauri (Khoo & Na, 2006;
Hjørland, 2007). Because relevance is defined as a relationship between a document surrogate and
a query, interpreting the meaning of searchers’ queries has also received attention under the rubric
of semantics (Hjørland, 1998; Blair, 2003). However, the interest in users’ conceptualizations of
information needs has led KO researchers towards Wittgenstein’s later theories of semantics as
“language games.” In this theory of semantics, words do not have a definite meaning, but may
change their meaning when used in different sentences or different contexts. The “language games”
theory has proven useful for understanding how searchers use terms in a query and how retrieval
systems might mediate their terms with those used in a representation (Hjørland, 1998; Blair,
2003).
Knowledge organization research has also focused on the semantics of classification systems and
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taxonomies of terms. For example, Svenonius’s treatment of bibliographic languages (2000) only
deals with the relational, referential, and categorical semantics found in organization vocabularies.
While the focus on query language has adopted a language-game orientation, the bases for the-
sauri have focused more heavily on Wittgenstein’s earlier “picture theory” of meaning, whereby
terms have a fixed definite meaning. Rules for the construction of taxonomies therefore seek to
disambiguate homonyms and polysemes through qualifiers that make them unique terms.
In contrast to KR languages, KO representation syntaxes, such as MARC or various flavors of
XML encoding, have not invested heavily in understanding the formal semantics that underlie their
representations. For the objective of retrieval of relevant document surrogates, KO’s focus has been
more heavily weighted towards the concerns listed above. Representation syntaxes for document
surrogates therefore are largely based on available data models that also enable efficient storage and
presentation (especially presentation that reifies practices found in cataloging codes—e.g., require-
ments for ISBD punctuation, etc.). Research on KO representation syntaxes demonstrates that
they often lack a strong data model and that they intertwine representations of various entities into
a single document surrogate (Attig, 1989; Heaney, 1995; Fattahi, 1997; Thomale, 2010). Although
we may think of production rules such as AACR2 as supplying “meaning” to these representations
(e.g., Tillett 2003), this uses a different sense of “meaning” than that supplied by the formal se-
mantics in KR languages.4 Colloquial understandings of “semantic” as “meaningful” also inform
studies of metadata quality which focus on definitional issues and confusions of metadata elements,
not overall grammars (Park, 2002; Hutt & Riley, 2005; Park, 2005; Park & Childress, 2009). As a
whole these studies illustrate Hjørland’s sense (2007) that our understanding of semantics is deeply
fragmented.
It is also important to recognize that many of these syntaxes are designed for the transport or
display of document surrogates and may not be directly used in the course of performing partic-
ular information retrieval tasks. As noted by the recent report from the Library of Congress, A
Bibliographic Framework for the Digital Age, MARC “was seldom used by systems as an internal
format” (Library of Congress, 2011). Instead, processes for extracting relevant information from
document surrogates are used to create indexes, etc., to which information retrieval queries are
4This attitude also appeared as an undercurrent in Dublin Core listserv discussions. Dublin Core and RDF were
seen as lacking semantics because they did not have a similar set of rules.
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actually applied. If the application of information retrieval/relevance algorithms is the kind of
intelligent reasoning used within KO, it is reasoning that takes place one step removed from the
document surrogate itself. Because such indexes rely on the use of extracted terms, this requires
the kind of relational semantics discussed by Svenonius (2000, 2004).
3.3.4 The Ontological Commitments of Knowledge Organization
The strongest commitment that knowledge organization makes is towards the relationship between
a user’s information need and some document that exists, one that may be represented for the
purposes of searching by a document surrogate. While codes of rules guide the production of such
surrogates, there is not an expectation that the meaning of records will be interpreted by machine.
To date, these commitments have entailed a dedication to document-like representation surrogates
with fixed syntaxes (e.g., the MARC format). By making relevance the prime objective, knowledge
organization has also committed itself to the assumption of a closed world. For example, relevance
judgements assume that if a relevant document exists, it will have a representation in the system.
If a valid query does not retrieve any documents, it is inferred that no relevant document exists.
This is the opposite of the open world assumption which enables one only to confirm the existence
of a representation. In the absence of a representation, it is not possible to assume that something
doesn’t exist. A closed world is a necessary commitment of most retrieval systems.
Rule systems for descriptive cataloging are frequently organized around ontological distinctions
among the types of materials being described. AACR2 ’s Part 1: Description divides the bib-
liographic universe into eleven distinct categories, each with its own rules that may change the
meaning and/or syntax of a MARC instance. The distinctions are based on the format of materi-
als (e.g., printed materials, electronic resources, microfilms), type of artistic content (e.g., moving
images, graphic materials, sound recordings), or mode of issuance (continuing resources, serials,
etc.) (American Library Association et al., 1988). For example, if a cataloger decides that the
item-at-hand is a reproduction, it requires the addition of a “reproduction note” (designated by
the 533 tag). While AACR2 provides definitions that describe the kinds of materials that fit these
categories, there is neither a formal representation of these ontological classes nor a mechanism to
directly relate a particular description to these classes of materials (e.g., to know that the item-at-
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hand is a reproduction). A cataloger knowledgeable about the rules may infer from the appearance
of a 533 “reproduction note” that the item described is a reproduction. However, in other cases,
inferring the class of materials from patterns in the representation may be unreliable.5 Decisions
regarding which set of cataloging rules to apply to a description of a particular resource are not
universally consistent. A cataloger may choose to apply different rules depending on the context
of the collection or purpose of the description, following high-level principles such as the Principle
of User Convenience. The same kind of object may be treated differently by different libraries,
within different systems, or when represented in different syntaxes.
An ongoing development within knowledge organization has been the refinement of other on-
tological entities inherent in bibliographic languages, currently represented by the Functional Re-
quirements for Bibliographic Records (FRBR) (IFLA Study Group on the Functional Requirements
for Bibliographic Records, 2009). FRBR distinguishes between four primary entities: works, ex-
pressions, manifestations, and items. While the recognition of these entities has helped efforts to
rewrite cataloging rules, FRBR’s development has mostly been independent of formal ontologies
found in KR. Much of the work on FRBR has focused on the vertical relationships between primary
entities. Horizontal relationships, such as those that involve equivalent, derivative, or descriptive
relationships, are less well understood and modeled (Tillett, 2001; Knowlton, 2009). While FRBR
may represent an important step towards recognizing entities that are implicit in cataloging codes,
it remains an essentially ontological distinction that is divorced from a formal semantics for docu-
ment surrogates.
A further complication in knowledge organization, broadly construed, is that different domains
also have distinct ontological commitments regarding different kinds of entities. This is especially
true in regard to how libraries, archives, and museums define which entities may be considered
to be “reproductions” or what the properties of reproductions are. While many approaches to
the 1:1 Principle identified by Han et al. (2009) seem rooted in the facsimile theory (whereby
a representation is about the original, with notes about the reproduction), museum and visual
resource rules treat images as distinctly different resources. For example:
In its least complex form, the surrogate might be compared to the bibliographic equiv-
5For example, understanding the implications of certain codes that appear as part of a 007 field.
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alent to the reproduction. . . . Many visual documents, however, are not copies. With
three-dimensional views of art, vantage point alone turns the visual document into
something other than just a copy in another form. (Most, 1998)
This attitude towards the relationships between works of art and surrogate images is an important
ontological distinction made by XML syntaxes based on the Categories for the Description of Works
of Art (CDWA) (Harpring & Baca, 2009) and VRACore (Visual Resources Association, 2007).
These ontological differences in how to treat conceptually different kinds of entities are mapped
onto common syntaxes, such as Dublin Core. This likely contributes to semantic confusion.
3.3.5 Significance for the 1:1 Principle
Traditionally, knowledge organization principles have been viewed as a means of ensuring the pri-
mary objective of a KO system—to provide the user with materials relevant to their information
needs. Because of this overriding principle, approaches to descriptive cataloging have been willing
to accept representation models that more accurately reflect a user’s expectations than an actual
state of affairs. This, at least, has been a primary motivation for developing a solution to the mul-
tiple versions problem and specifications for describing reproductions. While we may understand
cataloging rule systems as meaningful guides for producing records, the relationship between the
rules and the representations is indirect—so it is not possible to know which set of rules to use
when interpreting a record. While this may not pose a challenge for those steeped in the production
rules, their meaning may be opaque to other users of a representation. Because the meaning of a
representation is distinct from its role in an information retrieval process, however, it may succeed
in communicating information that is relevant to a user’s needs.
3.4 Conclusion
In Chapter 2 my account of the origins of the 1:1 Principle revealed that there were multiple
views of why such a principle was needed and how it should be implemented within the Dublin
Core Metadata Initiative. This chapter introduced two representation paradigms that present
alternative accounts of how representation languages work. Both are important to understanding
the distinctions raised in DCMI conversations about the Principle.
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From the perspective of the knowledge representation paradigm, formal semantics that use
names to refer to resources provide the mechanism needed to make metadata statements about
one, and only one, resource. Because these names are logical constants in a mathematical graph,
statements organize themselves into coherent, logical clusters of metadata. Whether a set of state-
ments consists of coherent propositions or not will depend on the formal interpretation used to
evaluate those statements.
From the perspective of knowledge organization, the 1:1 Principle is one among many compet-
ing and inconsistent principles metadata creators must balance. In the case of cultural heritage
repositories, records that satisfy the needs of users seeking cultural heritage resources have been
afforded a higher priority than records that are logically coherent. The 1:1 Principle is also in
direct conflict with rule interpretations for “reproductions” that specifically require the creation
of records that are never about one, and only one, thing. Metadata creators are forced to make
this choice, in part, because of constraints imposed by the knowledge organization paradigm’s
conceptualization of “document surrogates” with a fixed syntax, but informal semantics.
The identification of the paradigmatic divide has significant implications for the identification
of 1:1 Principle violations. Existing studies have relied on a colloquial understanding of the Prin-
ciple applied using qualitative methods. How colloquial heuristics of metadata quality should be
formalized remains an open question. However, before we can understand violations, it is nec-
essary to paint a clearer picture of how representations are “about” anything, let alone one and
only one thing. In the following chapter, we will explore how the knowledge representation domain
has formalized theories of description and reference that are lacking in the knowledge organization
domain.
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Chapter 4
Description and Reference for
Cultural Heritage Resources
Description is revelation. It is not
The thing described, nor false facsimile.
It is an artificial thing that exists,
In its own seeming, plainly visible,
Description without Place (Stevens, 1954)
4.1 Introduction
Libraries, archives, and museums holding cultural heritage resources commonly characterize their
role as not just storing artifacts, but providing meaning and context for the materials in their
collections. One of the ways they accomplish this is by making descriptions of those artifacts avail-
able. However, the preceding analysis of the 1:1 Principle now raises an important question—do
we really understand the formal nature of how descriptions of cultural heritage objects succeed in
describing? Understanding and developing formal theories of description and reference has been a
major theme in research in linguistics, the philosophy of language, and, more recently, computer
science. Despite the knowledge organization paradigm’s core interest in description, the literature
on the relationship between bibliographic description and formal theories of description is extraor-
dinarily thin (Smith, 1976; Blair, 2003). The prevalence of apparent failure to comply with the
1:1 Principle, and the difficulties of understanding the nature of those failures, reveals the dan-
gers of ignoring research on formal theories of description. This is especially true as the libraries,
archives, and museums (LAM) community considers replacing existing descriptive syntaxes with
representation languages grounded in formal semantics.
This chapter will explore the development of theories of description and reference in philosoph-
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ical circles and how these theories became necessary for computational reasoning using semantic
knowledge representations. So far, bibliographic languages have succeeded while using less formal
approaches. In some cases this has been because they have used less formal approaches that accom-
modate necessary ambiguities inherent in the cultural heritage domain. However, new expectations
and opportunities are inexorably moving description practices in the direction of logically explicit,
computer-processable formalizations. The 1:1 Principle problems observed by metadata-quality re-
searchers demonstrate the implications for translating these colloquial languages into more formal
representations.
4.2 Theories of Description and Reference
Over the course of the twentieth century, linguists and philosophers of language have investigated
approaches to formalizing our natural understanding of sentences—that is, to formalizing the se-
mantics of natural language. At the heart of this endeavor are theories of description and reference
(whether through the use of descriptions or proper names). While we routinely use descriptive sen-
tences in everyday life to successfully communicate meaning, these investigations have found that
it is surprisingly difficult to provide a formal account of how communication actually takes place.
The notions of reference, description, and meaning provide many enduring puzzles. Because this
work took place within communities that took a formal approach to these problems, emphasizing
symbolic logic as both a model and a method, it influenced the artificial intelligence community’s
efforts to represent our knowledge of the world in languages that would support computer-based
reasoning systems. These theories of description and reference, along with portions of mathemati-
cal logic, became the important parts of the background for the development of formal semantics
for knowledge representation languages.
4.2.1 Using Logical Definite Descriptions to Refer
In response to several puzzles about how definite descriptions (such as “the author of Waverley is
Scotch”1) contribute to the meaning of the sentences in which they occur, Bertrand Russell (1905)
1Pace to readers who are Scots. “Scotch” is the classic example used by Russell in his writings.
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offered the following analysis:2
The author of Waverley is Scotch. (4.1)
is to be understood as asserting:
At least one person authored Waverley (4.2a)
At most one person authored Waverley (4.2b)
Whoever authored Waverley is Scotch (4.2c)
or more formally expressed in first-order logic:
∃x(F (x) ∧ ∀y(F (y)→ x = y) ∧G(x)) (4.2d)
On this account, the referent of the definite description “The author of Waverley” is whoever is
the sole author of Waverley, if there is a sole author of Waverley. If there is no sole author of
Waverley, then the definite description has no referent. The sentence “The author of Waverley is
Scotch” is true if there is a sole author of Waverley and that person is a Scot, and false otherwise.
So if there is no author of Waverley, or there is more than one, then the description “The author
of Waverley” has no referent and the sentence “The author of Waverley is Scotch” is false. Note
that neither having a truth value nor having meaning requires that the description has a referent.
4.2.2 Using Names to Reference
Mona Lisa, Leonardo da Vinci, and Herman Melville are familiar proper names that we seem
to use effortlessly and meaningfully to refer to things in the world. But how does this reference
actually take place? Russell held that corresponding to every meaningful proper name was a
definite description which fixed the referent of the name (a view also held by Go¨ttlob Frege). The
definite description would then in turn be analyzed as described above. Approaches of this sort, as
exemplified by Russell and Frege, have been referred to as descriptivist theories of proper names.
2On Denoting is considered by many philosophers to be one of the most influential philosophy articles of the 20th
century
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However, Saul Kripke (1980) has convincingly challenged the descriptivist view of names as
surrogates for descriptions. Among other things, Kripke points out that we seldom seem to be able
to provide a reliable definite description of the sort Russell’s account demands for the proper names
that in fact we successfully use. After all, many people with hardly any knowledge of Renaissance
art history, or any definite sense of who Leonardo was, manage to refer to him successfully using
his name (“da Vinci was a famous general, I believe.” “No, he was not, he was an artist.”). Here
it seems that both participants are referring successfully to Leonardo da Vinci, although the first
may well have no knowledge of the sort that could be expressed in a typical definite description
that would actually uniquely pick out Leonardo da Vinci and no one else.
Kripke offers an alternative causal-historical approach, whereby names refer to their referents
through a causal chain of verbal communication and behavior that typically extends back to an
original immediate encounter with the named entity, often in what Kripke calls a baptismal event.
In this way, I can, after four hundred years, use the name “Leonardo da Vinci” to refer directly to
a particular individual without relying on a definite description to pick him out uniquely. Whether
a name refers to an entity depends on the causal chain through which I received the name, not
whether it satisfies some particular description I am using to fix its referent.
There are variations on these two theories of how descriptions and names refer. However, they
serve as the central influential approaches to reference used in contemporary knowledge represen-
tation languages on the Web.
4.3 Formal Semantic Representation Languages
Efforts to build formal knowledge representation languages emerged from the larger efforts to
develop methods of intelligent reasoning for artificial intelligence systems. According to the propo-
nents of knowledge representation within AI, in order to engage in intelligent reasoning, artificial
agents needed some representation of a world. This attitude distinguishes KR from other procedural
approaches to artificial intelligence (Davis et al., 1993; Sowa, 2000).
The agenda of the artificial intelligence community ran into a number of hard problems. First,
in order to reason successfully about the real world, a very large amount of knowledge needs to
be represented. This was the motivation behind projects such as Cyc, which represents one of
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the largest knowledge bases of basic facts (Lenat & Guha, 1990). Second, reasoning over this
information was limited by hard problems in the scalability of reasoning systems. And finally,
the limited expressiveness of first-order logic is challenged by the representation demands of many
common, modal, adverbial, and intensional notions. However, as noted in Chapter 2, research
on these problems informed approaches to describing resources on the Web, through the Warwick
Framework, Platform for Internet Content Selection, and Meta Content Framework. These streams
came together under the rubric of the Resource Description Framework. RDF and the work of the
knowledge representation paradigm were also the foundations for Tim Berners-Lee et al.’s thinking
about the Semantic Web (2001).
The Resource Description Framework represented a departure from the document-like struc-
tures that were being discussed in the early development of Dublin Core. Although XML may
be understood as a kind of directed graph (a tree), it affords developers many different ways to
represent the same kind of assertions. That is, I may define several different XML schemas that
represent a structured document containing information about your postal address. By examin-
ing the XML graph, parsers are able to answer questions about the document itself: e.g., which
elements are present in the document, which are contained within other elements, etc. However,
“there are in general a large number of ways in which the XML maps onto the logical tree,” creating
a great deal of complexity (Berners-Lee, 1998, 2009). RDF may also be represented as a directed
graph; however, this reverses the logical relationship with XML. RDF’s model represents a very
simple logical structure that can be represented in many different ways in XML. Regardless of
the particular XML syntax (or non-XML syntax), it results in the same RDF graph (Berners-Lee,
1998, 2009).
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://louvre.fr/works/779#">
<dcterms:title>Mona Lisa</dcterms:title>
</rdf:Description>
Figure 4.1: Example of an RDF Statement and the graph it represents
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An important part of logical languages, however, is the use of logical constants or names that
refer to the entity an assertion is about. Early knowledge representation systems each included their
own method of tracking referents within the system, often using natural language terms (Lenat
& Guha, 1990). However, when knowledge representation researchers attempted to use these
constants outside of local systems (e.g., by merging two knowledge bases) natural language terms
that represented different concepts could collide. The Semantic Web and RDF solve this problem
by using Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)3 as names for resources, defined as “anything that
has identity. Familiar examples include an electronic document, an image, a service (e.g., ‘today’s
weather report for Los Angeles’4), and a collection of other resources” (Halpin, 2009). When used
as logical constants by the RDF model-theory (Hayes, 2004), URIs function as names that denote
and appear as nodes in the RDF graph model. In a simple XML representation of RDF assertions
(a triple consisting of a URI subject, URI predicate, and some literal or non-literal value, as in
Figure 4.1 and Example A.4), it is not necessary to organize assertions into a hierarchical record
structure. Instead, the abstract graph that the XML syntax represents can organize nodes around
URIs. When the DCMI community contributed to the emergence of RDF, it was these kinds of
“logical clusters of metadata” its members had in mind (Lagoze, 1996, 1997; Weibel & Hakala,
1998; Bearman et al., 1999).
As conceived by Hayes (2004), URIs function much like Russell’s account of names, with the
important requirement that a formal interpretation is required that specifies what a name denotes.
However, Hayes’s approach is not accepted by Berners-Lee (2002) and some other members of the
Semantic Web community. Instead, Berners-Lee prefers an account which is closer to Kripke’s
causal-historical approach to names (Berners-Lee, 2002; Hayes & Halpin, 2008; Halpin, 2011).
Although this is a debate about how URIs come to denote resources, it does not change their
fundamental role as constants within logical statements in RDF. In the following section, we explore
how traditional approaches to bibliographic description take a very different approach to developing
descriptions.
3http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986
4http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2396
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4.4 Bibliographic Description
In the sections above we have demonstrated how knowledge representation languages, like RDF,
have a formalized theory of description and reference. While we also talk about bibliographic
records as “describing” resources, it is unclear whether we can apply these theories directly to
existing descriptions. In this section we explore the nature of bibliographic representations in
relation to more formal approaches to description. As we saw in Chapter 2, both the MARC
format and XML syntaxes have been used in similar ways by the LAM community. We find that
additional work will be needed to supply implicit semantics to these formal syntaxes, especially in
cases where a record refers to multiple versions or reproductions of resources.
Because the 1:1 Principle seems to be concerned primarily with distinguishing between different
“manifestations or versions” of resources, my discussion here focuses on the practice of descriptive
cataloging as opposed to subject cataloging or indexing. Definitions of the objectives and roles of
descriptive cataloging within the process of bibliographic control contain informal understandings
of how description works and its relationship to bibliographic syntaxes.
Identification and description are interrelated processes in descriptive cataloging. Iden-
tification consists of the choice of conventional elements, guided by a set of rules based
on agreed-upon international standards. When the cataloger has properly identified the
conventional elements, they are described in a catalog record in such a fashion that the
description is unique and can be applied to no other entity in the collection. In other
words, each resource should be distinguished from everything with which it could be
confused. (Taylor & Joudrey, 2010)
The international standards, such as the International Standard for Bibliographic Description
(ISBD) mentioned by Taylor & Joudrey (2010), are primarily oriented towards the production of
uniform, consistent bibliographic records that may be shared across cataloging utilities (Rodriguez,
2010). To ensure consistency they prescribe standards for punctuation, abbreviations, what sources
of evidence could be used for description, and the overall arrangement of bibliographic elements in
a record. Because the focus is on the exchange of information, ISBD and other descriptive cata-
loging standards are mostly concerned with manifestation-level properties of resources. For general
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library collections, “[t]he detailed physical description has always been criticized as not necessary
and less economic, but it is important information for library activities such as storage, circulation,
and conservation” (Rodriguez, 2010).
Descriptive cataloging is tied most directly to the identify and select functions of a catalog.
First, it allows users searching for known items to discover whether the resource is available within
a particular bibliographic utility. If multiple entries match this initial request, a description should
be sufficiently precise to allow the user to select a resource that best meets their needs from among
the available manifestations (Taylor & Joudrey, 2010).
4.4.1 Records and Bibliographic Surrogates
Catalogs represented an important innovation in the early development of the library. Rather than
relying on the organization of the physical collection, the catalog could allow librarians and users to
navigate the collection according to different intellectual facets. Ultimately, however, the catalog
needed to provide a relationship between the catalog representation and the object sought by the
user (i.e., the obtain function). However, because the catalog was seen as a substitute for the actual
collection, bibliographic records are frequently referred to as “surrogates” (Svenonius, 1989, 2000,
2004; Greenberg, 2010; Rodriguez, 2010).
In other words, bibliographic control is the process of describing information resources
and providing name, title, and subject access to the descriptions, resulting in records
that serve as surrogates for the actual items of recorded information. These surrogate
records (sometimes called entries, bibliographic records, or simply metadata) are then
placed into information retrieval tools, where the records act as pointers to the actual
information resources. The comprehensive descriptions found in the records provide
users with enough information to determine the potential value of the resources with-
out actually having to view the items directly. Surrogate records are stored in a variety
of retrieval tools including bibliographies, catalogs, indexes, finding aids, museum reg-
isters, bibliographic databases, and search engines. (Taylor & Joudrey, 2010)
Among the various definitions of bibliographic records and their function within cataloging
systems, I have been unable to identify any associations with the formal theories of description
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and reference that are so closely associated with knowledge representation approaches. As noted
in Chapter 3, the information retrieval literature has been more interested in Wittgenstein’s later
theories of language games (Blair, 1992; Svenonius, 2000; Blair, 2003; Svenonius, 2004). While
language games may be useful in determining what resources (or representations of resources)
are relevant to a user’s query, they have not been sufficiently applied to explain the relationship
between a representation and the resource to which it refers. While discussions of the semantics of
thesauri and controlled vocabularies do take up concepts of referential semantics, these are limited
to discussions about the relationships between terms and the classes of resources they represent
(Svenonius, 2000; Khoo & Na, 2006; Hjørland, 2007).
The lack of a clear theory of description and reference has shaped the development of cataloging
codes, functional requirements, and syntaxes used in the knowledge organization domain. The
direct re-application of these rules and expectations for record syntaxes to metadata appears to
be complicit in the confusions surrounding the 1:1 Principle. In the following sections, I will show
that current syntaxes lack a relationship to formal data or semantic models and will explore the
difficulties of associating these syntaxes with existing theories of description and reference.
4.4.2 Data Model or Document Model
The original intent of the MARC format was to support the transport of records between cataloging
systems using linear storage technologies such as punch cards or magnetic tapes. The format was
not originally designed to represent a model of the bibliographic universe, but rather to enable
the production of physical card catalogs or card-like online catalog displays. It provides “a mech-
anism for organizing and labeling the data in a record [emph. mine]” (Attig, 1989). “ISO 2709
[MARC] only specifies tags as three character numeric, but does not designate the semantics of any
tag number” (McCallum, 2010). MARC’s principle orientation is towards preserving the conven-
tions in existing standards such as the ISBD and the Anglo-American Cataloging Rules (Spanhoff,
2002). As a data storage model developed in the mid-1960s, MARC precedes all of the major
advances that introduced formalizations that explicitly identified and related formal semantics to
data representations.5
5Such as Codd’s Relational Database Theory (1970) or Chen’s Entity-Relationship models (1976).
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Rather than considering MARC as encoding formal semantic structures, in the vein of knowledge
representation languages, it is more appropriate to treat it as a markup language for bibliographic
documents (Jul, 2009). The MARC format lacks a formal data model and is not associated with
any unambiguous formal semantic interpretation (Heaney, 1995; Thomale, 2010). The difficul-
ties of attempts to directly translate MARC’s informal syntax into more formal representations
demonstrate its weaknesses (Coyle, 2011).
Furthermore, the move from MARC to established, syntactically well-defined markup languages,
such as XML, does not necessarily ensure the sort of explicit semantics associated with knowledge
representation languages.
. . . even though SGML/XML is thought of as providing access to a document’s meaning-
ful structure, current SGML/XML methods cannot represent the fundamental semantic
relationships amongst document components and features in a systematic machine-
processable way. . . . The result is that SGML/XML markup language users must guess
at the semantic relationships the markup language designer had in mind, but no way
to formally express. (Renear et al., 2002)
For both MARC records and Dublin Core XML representations, developing an interpretation of
the intended semantics often requires an understanding of context within the document. “In
MARC, punctuation that appears in one subfield can subtly change the meaning of data in a
different subfield; changing subfield order can also subtly change the data’s meaning” (Thomale,
2010). When documents are translated into different syntactic schemas or interpreted in different
contexts, the meaning found in original documents and contexts may be lost. The problem can
be particularly acute when polysemes and synonyms are introduced across schemas (Renear et al.,
2000; Park, 2002; Dubin et al., 2003; Park, 2005).
4.4.3 Understanding Descriptive Documents
As document markup, bibliographic representations differ little from the markup of other kinds
of documents—for example, an HTML page, a Text Encoding Initiative (TEI) representation of
a piece of correspondence, etc. In this sense, a bibliographic record can be seen as a surrogate
document that “stands in” for an actual resource in a knowledge organization system (whether
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that representation is an analog card catalog or an electronic file). When we ask what a record is
“about,” it may be in the same sense that Moby Dick is “about” whaling (what Ryle (1933) calls
“about-linguistic”) (Wilson, 1968). The question of whether a bibliographic document must always
refer to one, and only one, resource seems unclear from the knowledge organization literature (i.e.,
as a Russellian definite description or what Ryle (1933) calls “about-referential”).
The problems surrounding the description of reproductions and multiple versions highlight the
problematic nature of assuming that all records function in this manner. The current recommenda-
tions remain divided between facsimile theory and edition theory approaches that designate what
the primary resource is that is being described. However, both approaches appear to be refer-
ring in different ways. For example, consider what each approach suggests in terms of a definite
description, along the lines of Russell’s “The F is G”
facsimile theory: The resource entitled Moby Dick and written by Herman Melville
in 1851 is reproduced by a PDF file
edition theory: A PDF file reproduces the resource entitled Moby Dick and written
by Herman Melville in 1851.
Current fixed syntaxes require catalogers to choose one or the other approach. This choice is
influenced by a number of factors, such as user expectations and the type of collection being
described (e.g., collections that consist wholly of reproductions prefer the facsimile approach).
While the syntaxes of bibliographic records are fixed, their implicit semantics allow them to be used
in either way. In aggregation environments, sophisticated rules would be necessary to understand
which of the two approaches was used in each aggregated record. This may be possible for syntaxes
like MARC that are sufficiently granular; but in simple Dublin Core, the subtle distinctions in the
meaning of elements are lost.
Additional theoretical work is needed to help understand whether formal theories of description
are in operation at a different level of representation within bibliographic systems (e.g., the indexes,
etc. derived from bibliographic records). It is unclear from this investigation whether it will be
possible to supply bibliographic records with the kinds of semantics implied by these theories.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have identified two fundamental theories of description and reference that are
the basis of knowledge representation semantics. While these theories are not untroubled by hard
philosophical problems, knowledgeable members of the KR community can defend their positions
based on well-defined philosophical debates. These theories are not just theories of descriptions
which are informative, but rather descriptions that uniquely refer to one, and only one, thing. As
the theoretical basis for knowledge representation semantics, this translates into formal descriptions
that are logically sound references to resources. In the case of RDF, reference is established through
the use of URIs as names. Any properties that are attached to one such name are therefore a
description of the resource referred to by the URI.
In contrast, knowledge organization practices lack a formal theory of description, substituting
an informal understanding of “surrogates” that stand in for resources. Yet, definitions of records
suggest that there is an expectation for records to “point at” the resources for which they are
surrogates. However, formal theories of description do not appear to be part of emerging conceptual
models in this area. These attitudes towards surrogates have persisted across several technological
shifts, from cards, to MARC, and onward to conceptions of metadata. Although the 1:1 Principle
attempts to confront these attitudes, the relationship between the Principle and fundamental
theories of description and reference is obscured in Dublin Core documentation oriented towards
knowledge organization practices.
The identification of the formal semantics and formal theories of description and reference in
the knowledge representation paradigm appears to provide a grounding for detecting 1:1 Principle
violations. However, in this chapter we have also found that knowledge organization practices do
not share these same assumptions and formal models. In Chapter 5, I will explore the implications
these theories have for existing methods of detecting 1:1 Principle violations that appear in cultural
heritage Open Archives Initiative Protocol for Metadata Harvesting (OAI-PMH) repositories.
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Chapter 5
Revisiting 1:1 Principle Violations
It is perhaps worth while saying that semantics as it is conceived in this paper (and in
former papers of the author) is a sober and modest discipline which has no pretensions
of being a universal patent-medicine for all the ills and diseases of mankind, whether
imaginary or real. You will not find in semantics any remedy for decayed teeth or
illusions of grandeur or class conflicts. Nor is semantics a device for establishing that
everyone except the speaker and his friends is speaking nonsense. (Tarski, 1944)
5.1 Introduction
An objective that both knowledge organization languages and contemporary Semantic Web knowl-
edge representation languages share is the ability for systems to usefully exchange and use rep-
resentations. Within the knowledge organization domain, emphasis has been placed on creating
interoperable metadata that conforms to community standards of quality. Studies of metadata
quality have led KO researchers to discover that cultural heritage metadata frequently fails to
conform to their interpretations of the Dublin Core 1:1 Principle.
However, because definitions of interoperability and quality are broadly defined, operational-
izing our understandings often depends on the framework of a paradigm. This chapter examines
how contemporary metadata quality research, based in the knowledge organization paradigm, has
developed techniques to identify 1:1 Principle violations. However, when viewed through the lens
of knowledge representation, I find that the differences between paradigms make formalizing KO
accounts of 1:1 Principle violations into KR languages difficult, if not impossible.
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5.2 Metadata Interoperability and Quality
An important objective for knowledge organization standards has been to enable the distribution
of representations among individual systems and cataloging environments. Standardization for the
purposes of record exchange has been an important area of work in the library community, from
the launch of the Library of Congress’s card distribution program through contemporary metadata
exchange protocols, including the Open Archives Initiative Protocol for Metadata Harvesting (OAI-
PMH) (Svenonius, 2000). Interoperability not only requires a standardization of formats, but also
a commitment to community-defined standards of quality.
5.2.1 Interoperability
Haslhofer & Klas (2010) cite metadata interoperability as “a prerequisite for uniform access to
media objects in multiple autonomous and heterogenous information systems.” Interoperability is
a broadly defined concept that ranges from low-level capabilities of computer systems to understand
files through higher-level abilities to preserve the meaning of the information that is exchanged.
The DCMI also provides a hierarchy of interoperability levels for users of Dublin Core, as shown
in Table 5.1 (Nilsson et al., 2009).
4 Description Set Profile interoperability
• Shared formal vocabularies and constraints in records
3 Description Set syntactic interoperability
• Shared formal vocabularies in exchangeable records
2 Formal semantic interoperability
• Shared vocabularies based on formal semantics
1 Shared term definitions
• Shared vocabularies defined in natural language
Table 5.1: DCMI Interoperability Levels based on Nilsson et al. (2009)
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Because many of the studies about the 1:1 Principle use metadata exchanged through OAI-
PMH, it is also useful to understand how the protocol specified a “low-barrier approach to enable
metadata harvesting” (Van de Sompel & Lagoze, 2000). OAI-PMH provides two kinds of interop-
erability:
• syntax: an XML schema that provides a container architecture for descriptive metadata.
• transactional: a communication protocol that allows metadata providers and metadata har-
vesters to engage in exchange transactions.
Because the developers of OAI-PMH intended it to be useful across many different kinds of reposito-
ries and genres of materials, the container architecture allows a repository to include domain-specific
metadata in a container. That is, OAI-PMH allows repositories to define both the vocabularies
and the semantics for locally relevant metadata. To ensure a baseline of syntactic interoperability
across all repositories, OAI-PMH does require a simple set of Dublin Core properties that pro-
vides a shared vocabulary of terms (Lagoze et al., 2008)—i.e., Level 1 in the hierarchy in Nilsson
et al. (2009). The focus of OAI-PMH, therefore, is on enabling the successful transfer of a meta-
data package from one repository to another. The preservation of the meaning of the metadata
exchanged in this way depends on outside specifications. These include Dublin Core and other
community-specific standards that provide guidelines, rules, and vocabulary definitions. As we
have seen in earlier chapters, how that meaning is supplied varies between paradigms. In knowl-
edge organization, a representation’s meaning is bound to human-readable rule systems that are
not represented formally. In order to evaluate a representation, it is therefore necessary to define
operational definitions of quality.
5.2.2 Quality
How to define metadata quality has been the subject of ongoing effort within the digital library
community. Park (2009) provides a comprehensive account of recent trends. Relevant to our
discussion about the 1:1 Principle is a series of quality-centered investigations that examined OAI-
PMH metadata from cultural heritage aggregations (Bruce & Hillmann, 2002; Dushay & Hillmann,
2003; Hillmann et al., 2004; Stvilia et al., 2004; Hutt & Riley, 2005; Shreeves et al., 2005, 2006;
Hillmann, 2008; Han et al., 2009).
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Intrinsic Quality Relational Quality
Accuracy/Validity Accuracy
Cohesiveness Completeness
Complexity Complexity
Semantic Consistency Latency/Speed
Structural Consistency Naturalness
Currency Informativeness
Informativeness Relevance (Aboutness)
Naturalness Precision
Precision Security
Verifiability
Reputational Quality Volatility
Authority
Table 5.2: Information Quality Categories & Dimensions from Shreeves et al. (2005)
Stvilia et al. (2004, 2007) and Shreeves et al. (2005) provide a framework for metadata quality
that is based on features shown in Table 5.2.2. These attempt to measure the “fitness for use”
of metadata. These features can be organized in three categories: intrinsic information quality
(IQ), relational/contextual quality (RQ), and Reputational Quality. Intrinsic information quality
can be objectively measured by assessing “attributes of information items themselves in relation
to a reference standard, such as spelling mistakes and conformance to a date encoding standard”
(Shreeves et al., 2005). Attributes of relational/contextual quality:
measure how well an information object reflects some external condition (e.g., actual
accuracy of addresses in an address database). Since metadata records are surrogates for
information objects, many relational dimensions apply in measuring metadata quality.
(Shreeves et al., 2005)
For Stvilia et al. (2004, 2007) and Shreeves et al. (2005), these “uses” of metadata are the traditional
find, identify, select, and obtain objectives found in the knowledge organization paradigm. The
framework used by Stvilia et al. (2004) measured the impact of poor-quality metadata on both
the find activity (i.e., inaccurate metadata would prevent users from finding objects they needed)
and the obtain activity (i.e., incorrect metadata could prevent a user from obtaining an item, for
example if an invalid URL were provided).
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Part of the ability of metadata to meet these needs is its semantic consistency or “the extent
to which the collections use the same values (vocabulary control) and elements for conveying the
same concepts and meanings throughout” (Shreeves et al., 2005). Such semantic consistency is
also important for the interoperability of metadata in aggregated environments, where automated
processes may be applied to normalize metadata to prepare it for use with metadata from other
repositories (Shreeves et al., 2005). This sense of semantics is based on the natural language
definitions provided by standards documentation, not on a set of formal semantic specifications
that would be found in a KR language (recalling, again, the hierarchy of interoperability in Nilsson
et al. (2009)).
5.2.3 1:1 Principle Violations
Within the account of quality provided by Shreeves et al. (2005) are both intrinsic and relational
aspects related to the 1:1 Principle:
intrinsic cohesiveness: the extent to which the content of an object is focused on
one topic.
relational accuracy: the degree to which an information object correctly. represents
another information object or a process in the context of a particular activity.
However, each of these measures of quality is grounded within the contexts of some particular
activity (i.e., the find activity) or through the specification of some “outside reference source,”
such as a set of cataloging rules or a descriptive vocabulary, like Dublin Core (Shreeves et al.,
2005).
In their analysis of individual metadata records, Shreeves et al. (2005) found that a particular
source of ambiguity that reduced metadata quality consisted of metadata records that appeared to
include information about both an “original” resource and a “digital” resource.
. . . no collection maintained a consistent one-to-one mapping between the metadata
and a single resource. . . . These practices represent a very real and understandable
tension between the need for standardized, accurate description of digital objects and
description that meets the needs of end users. (Shreeves et al., 2005)
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In practice, Shreeves et al. (2005) found that between 57% and 100% of records in their sample
included properties for both physical and digital manifestations of a resource. Not only did these
ambiguities impair find tasks. They also limited the ability of aggregators to provide services
relevant to users’ needs. One such example mixed physical/analog dimensions with electronic file
attributes, as shown in Figure 5.1.
<description>100 x 70 cm</description>
<description>image/tiff</description>
<format>image/jpeg</format>
<format>Any machine capable of running
a graphical Web browser, 640x480
minimum monitor resolution
</format>
Figure 5.1: Example of 1:1 Principle inconsistencies identified by Shreeves et al. (2005)
These findings were confirmed by Hutt & Riley (2005):
The 1:1 Principle, which requires DC records to describe exclusively one version of a
resource, is particularly problematic for cultural heritage institutions where the major-
ity of digital objects are not born digital, but are instead created from the digitization
of existing analog materials. Therefore, it is common for multiple versions of an intel-
lectual object to exist within a single institution, often including the original analog
materials, the master digital file, and at least one derivative digital file. Representing
this complexity in the OAI DC environment obviously presents a challenge. . . . This
leaves data providers with two choices, create records that adhere to the 1:1 rule and
omit pertinent information, or violate the rule. We observed many cases in which data
providers chose to violate the rule and combine data about the original intellectual
object as well as its digital manifestation.
In their study of a single digital repository system (CONTENTdm), Han et al. (2009) also found
that many descriptions included statements about both digital and physical manifestations. In the
local CONTENTdm environment, the meaning of local properties may indicate what kind of entity
the property intends to describe (for example, a property such as digital.format). Following on
concerns raised during Dublin Core’s early development (see Chapter 2), Han et al. (2009) note that
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“no element in Dublin Core can distinguish between different manifestations. . . usually conflicting
fields are mapped to the same Dublin Core element.”
Because local projects frequently use a mix of local standards (such as MARC, Encoded Archival
Description (EAD), Dublin Core, Metadata Object Description Standard (MODS), etc.) many
opportunities for these kinds of mapping problems occur when their content is translated into
simple OAI-PMH Dublin Core. For large-scale aggregation projects this can increase the cost of
providing needed services (Foulonneau & Cole, 2005). Furthermore, “nonstandard use of fields
seemed to be more prevalent with Dublin Core” (Palmer et al., 2007).
Miller (2010) notes that 1:1 Principle problems also result from “database and user interface
systems [that] do not have the capacity to adequately link separate records and to display them
together in a clear and meaningful way for end users.” Systems such as CONTENTdm (studied by
Han et al. 2009) also base their primary information models around digital assets, such as single
files, making it difficult to independently represent non-digital resources from which those files were
derived. Such systems enable metadata creators to create specialized, locally specified metadata
elements on a collection-by-collection or project-by-project basis. The ease which these systems
allow the addition of new properties encourages ad-hoc modeling of metadata optimized for display
in one local context, rather than more formal and rigorous methods of information modeling.
Despite the formal specifications provided by the DCMI Abstract Model (Powell et al., 2004),
metadata creators find the 1:1 Principle “particularly confusing” (Park & Childress, 2009):
The problem with DC aside from its ambiguity is the failure of the 1:1 Principle.
Inevitably implementors use a single record to describe both original (what users are
really interested in) and digital. DC is still really only for digital manifestations. . . .
What’s needed in DC is a simple subset of elements clearly designated for the digital
manifestation with the primary element reserved for the original object.
In the previous chapters we found that the Dublin Core 1:1 Principle is grounded in require-
ments that are found in knowledge representation languages, but that these requirements are not
essential for knowledge organization document surrogates, for which practitioners have developed
a conflicted set of approaches for describing originals and reproductions. In light of the analysis so
far, the findings of metadata quality studies seem consistent with a culture of practice based in KO
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approaches. When seen as a principle of guidance rather than a principle of reasoning, creating
metadata documents that meet users’ needs is paramount. Because many of the rule systems based
on AACR2 are bound to principles of guidance, they often encourage metadata creators to make
pragmatic choices in representations. When they are also bound to the expectations of a partic-
ular syntax (e.g., MARC) or information retrieval system (e.g., CONTENTdm), applying them
to alternative syntaxes/systems (e.g., Dublin Core or OAI-PMH) may result in the inconsistencies
identified by metadata quality studies. In the sections that follow, we will look more closely at the
presuppositions inherent in these studies, with an eye towards what would be required to translate
them into a formal knowledge representation language.
5.3 Principle Presuppositions
The example provided by Hillmann (2003) is a caution against “metadata” that describes both the
properties of the Mona Lisa (a painting created in the 16th century) and a digital image (a JPEG).
An example of a record that has been interpreted as “violating” the 1:1 Principle is provided in
Example A.1, a fragment of which is included below.
<title>Mona Lisa</title>
<date>2008</date>
<date>1501-1519</date>
<source>TIFF</source>
<type>image</type>
<format>oil on poplar board</format>
<format>H. 77 cm; W. 53 cm</format>
<format>image/jpeg</format>
<format>16781 bytes</format>
Figure 5.2: Example of a Dublin Core record that “violates” the 1:1 Principle
In order to help understand which records count as violations of the 1:1 Principle according to
current studies, we will first unpack the criteria these studies have used. This will entail examining
their assumptions about the syntax of records, the meaning of individual Dublin Core properties,
the meaning of property/value statements, and the larger contexts in which these judgments are
being made (Hutt & Riley, 2005; Shreeves et al., 2005; Park & Childress, 2009).
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5.3.1 Interpreting the Formal Semantics of Syntaxes
In Chapter 2, we saw that many early discussions centered around a need to create “logical clusters
of metadata” that might be organized into “packages” (Lagoze, 1996; Weibel & Hakala, 1998;
Bearman et al., 1999). However, definitions of what, exactly, the 1:1 Principle applies to are
ambiguous within different DCMI documents. Hillmann’s account of the 1:1 Principle (2003)
ambiguously suggests that “metadata” is the object of the Principle while Woodley et al. (2005)
suggest this the object is “records.” The more formal DCMI Abstract Model (Powell et al., 2007),
which was developed after the articulation of the 1:1 Principle, states:
The abstract model presented above indicates that each DC metadata description de-
scribes one, and only one, resource. This is commonly referred to as the one-to-one
principle.
However, real-world metadata applications tend to be based on loosely grouped sets of
descriptions (where the described resources are typically related in some way), known
here as description sets. For example, a description set might comprise descriptions of
both a painting and the artist. (Powell et al., 2007)
Despite the underspecification of what the 1:1 Principle applied to, various studies have adopted
“records” as the unit of analysis for metadata quality (Stvilia et al., 2004; Hutt & Riley, 2005;
Shreeves et al., 2005; Stvilia et al., 2007; Han et al., 2009). However, as is demonstrated by
Example A.1, this does not refer to an OAI-PMH record, but rather to all of the element/value
pairs that are children of the OAI-PMH metadata element as is shown in Figure 5.3.
<oai:record>
<metadata>
<!-- Only XML Elements that appear at this
level of the XML document are considered
to be "records" -->
</metadata>
</oai:record>
Figure 5.3: Selecting the metadata node as the object of 1:1 Principle violations
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The OAI-PMH specification itself does not directly license the assumption that metadata con-
tained in a metadata node is about one, and only one, thing. In fact, OAI-PMH asserts that
it is not concerned with the nature of resources being described (Lagoze et al., 2008). The OAI
XML schema1 merely provides us with a specification for the structural organization of an OAI
document. It explicitly leaves the specification of what metadata is “about” to the semantics of
the enclosed metadata. This attitude is also reflected in the original Warwick Framework, which
preferred to defer the meaning of metadata packages to individual implementations:
Each logically distinct metadata set may represent the interests of and domain of ex-
pertise of a specific community; for example, catalogers should create and maintain
descriptive cataloging sets and parties with legal and business expertise should over-
see terms and conditions metadata sets. The syntax and notation of each should be
determined by the responsible party and fit the semantic requirements of the type of
metadata. (Lagoze, 1996)
For example, an OAI-PMH item might be associated with a VRACore, MODS, or CDWA
representation that allows for a single record to represent several related objects (see Example
A.2). Because OAI-PMH does not specify the relationship between an OAI item and any particular
resource, it can support a representation about both the Mona Lisa itself and an image of the Mona
Lisa. The OAI specification leaves undecided how such rich representations should be “dumbed-
down” into the required simple Dublin Core. A complex representation like Example A.2 could
easily result in a representation that looks like Example A.1.
In the end, the semantics of the metadata associated with an object need to be under-
stood by the “consumers” of the metadata—the clients and agents that access objects
and the users that configure these clients and agents. We run the danger, with the full
expressiveness of the Warwick Framework, of creating such complexity that the meta-
data is effectively useless. Finding the appropriate balance is a central design problem.
(Lagoze, 1996)
A main interoperability requirement of the OAI-PMH protocol was that each OAI Item would
be associated with a simple Dublin Core representation. While the overall structure of the OAI-
1http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd
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PMH record syntax did not prevent the inclusion of more discrete “packages” of Dublin Core
elements within the metadata container, at the time that OAI was developed DCMI had not
provided a recommended XML syntax. Initially the OAI community provided a flat, simple Dublin
Core syntax until it was later superseded by the official DCMI recommendation (Lagoze & Van de
Sompel, 2001). However, the official DCMI recommendation for this simple syntax distanced itself
from specifying a formal grammatical semantics, stating “there is no formal linkage between a
simple DC record and the resource being described. Such a linkage may be made by encoding the
URI of the resource as the value of the DC Identifier element, however this is not mandatory”
(Powell & Johnston, 2003).2 While this schema associates XML elements with individual Dublin
Core property definitions, it does not provide a formal semantic model for “records,” noting:
. . . it is anticipated that records will be encoded within one or more container XML
element(s) of some kind. This document makes no recommendations for the name of
any container element, nor for the namespace that the element should be taken from.
(Powell & Johnston, 2003)
The inclusion of the newly emerging abstract data model in Powell & Johnston (2003) suggests
that records are “made up of one or more properties, each property is an attribute of the resource
being described” (Powell & Johnston, 2003). Because this model defers the relationship between a
resource and a record to a container syntax, the initial abstract model stops short of claiming that
records are about “one, and only one” resource. Since OAI-PMH defers the relationship between
a representation and an object to the enclosed metadata standard, the descriptive relationship is
left underspecified in its own use of simple Dublin Core.
From this discussion, we learn that the semantics of an OAI-PMH XML document are un-
derspecified. In order to analyze OAI-PMH documents for metadata quality, researchers have
treated the elements contained in metadata nodes as a single unit with the expectation that as a
whole, all elements are about the same resource (in conformance with their interpretation of the
1:1 Principle).
2This statement is unclear about whether the mere presence of a URI established a formal relationship. For more
on the implications of this ambiguity, see Renear et al. (2011) and Wickett et al. (2012).
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Semantic Relationships among Elements
A second concern raised by metadata quality researchers is the relationship between repeated
elements found in an OAI-PMH metadata container. The assumption provided by researchers is
that there exists a conjunctive relationship between element/value pairs, at least when the same
Dublin Core element is repeated within the metadata element. For example, the meaning of the
following set of XML elements could be interpreted as asserting “the resource has the format oil
on board AND image/jpeg”:
<dc:format>oil on board</dc:format>
<dc:format>image/jpeg</dc:format>
However, because the semantics of the Dublin Core XML syntax are underspecified, this is not the
only interpretation that could be supplied for the same element/value pairs. Early Dublin Core
schemas noted that “the semantics of repeated elements are not specified” (Burnard et al., 1996).
While a container syntax like OAI-PMH might demarcate one set of metadata elements from
another, different applications might wish to transform it into different kinds of representations
that might supply different kinds of relationships between the elements (e.g., to a mapping for a
particular data model or into first-order predicate logic) (Renear et al., 2000; Sperberg-McQueen &
Miller, 2004). Rather than assuming that the relationship between repeated elements is conjunctive,
we might supply an interpretation that treated sibling elements as disjunctive (for example, if we
were creating a list of terms that we wished to be unique).
Figure 5.4 illustrates that all we may know about an XML document is that a hierarchical
relationship exists between elements. The semantics of these relationships are unknown. The
manner in which we treat other XML properties expressed in this OAI document illustrates the
point. Although we may wish to understand an OAI Item that contains metadata “about a single
resource,” OAI does not specify what may count as a resource (i.e., it is also possible to provide
a description of some complex resource that has multiple parts). We also do not interpret the
entire OAI record to be “about an OAI Item”; rather, it has some other relationship to some
Item (and thereby a resource). The OAI document is merely a constituent of an OAI repository.
The inclusion of elements such as oai:responsedate and oai:datestamp are reflexively about
the OAI document itself (see Example A.1). While human readers may be able to intuitively shift
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Figure 5.4: XML Tree of an OAI-PMH representation
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their attention from the OAI Item context, to OAI record context, to metadata context, a formal
semantic relationship between the document and a described resource is not supported by the
OAI-PMH syntax, nor by the OAI Dublin Core XML schema.
Implicit Meaning of Values
An analysis of cultural heritage Dublin Core records provided by Hutt & Riley (2005) adds addi-
tional requirements to being able to identify 1:1 Principle violations that depend on the interpre-
tation of expressed values. In their observations, they classified values that appeared in statements
according to “pseudo qualifiers that refine the meaning of an element” and “semantic types.” For
example, a dc:date statement could include a value such as “Digitized: 2005-01-19” to offer an
implicit narrowing of the general meaning of “a date in the lifecycle of a resource.”3 Even when
such pseudo-qualifiers were not present, Hutt & Riley (2005) were able to classify values into three
broad categories, shown in Figure 5.5.
Unique Values All Values
Digitization Date 5286 40.68% 8026 24.33%
Creation Date 7585 58.37% 24624 74.64%
Copyright Date 124 0.95% 339 1.03%
Total 124995 100% 32989 100%
Figure 5.5: “Semantic Types” for date values found by Hutt & Riley (2005)
The assignment of these values to these classes was conducted as part of a qualitative analysis
that used unspecified “high level assumptions” about the nature of date values (Hutt & Riley,
2005). While this provides a useful high-level classification of date values, it is unclear how the
assumptions might be represented in a more formal analysis of date values.
Hutt & Riley’s approach (2005) to assigning “semantic types” to values is not limited to dates
and creators. Their approach could equally be applied to a significant property of Dublin Core,
the identifier property. Currently the library community relies on manifestation-level identifiers
such as ISBNs and ISSNs. Emerging identifier systems, such as Digital Object Identifiers (DOIs)
may be assigned to different conceptual entities. Many institutions rely on locally maintained
3Although this statement is not necessarily associated with more specific refinements provided by DCMI Terms,
e.g., dcterms:created.
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numbering schemes, such as museum accession numbers (year.accessionOrdinal.itemOrdinal). As
readers we may also understand the “meaning” of such values based on orthographic features and
whether they are associated with a particular kind of entity.4 However, the LAM community
has been reluctant to adopt universal identification schemes, which have largely originated from
outside the community (Vitiello, 2004). In the case of URLs used to access online resources, their
assignment frequently relies on underlying system architectures of content management systems
(e.g., CONTENTdm). Han et al. (2009) found that local schemas ofter additional granularity to
define local identifier values that are often mapped to Dublin Core identifier. Figure 5.6 provides
examples of the kinds of identifiers that are found within the same type of metadata node in an
OAI Record.
<metadata>
<dc:identifier>Case Pullman 05/02/03 Folder 9 Sheet 509</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>NL002641.tif</dc:identifier>
</metadata>
<metadata>
<dc:identifier>ALA-9901014-5-1</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>ala-9901014-5-064</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>http://images.library.uiuc.edu:8081/u?/ALA,58</dc:identifier>
</metadata>
<metadata>
<dc:identifier>lccn:09033358</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>http://name.ex.edu/AEY0004.0001.001</dc:identifier>
</metadata>
<metadata>
<dc:identifier>X68.2890</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>http://content.ex.org/ark:/13030/hb6779p502/</dc:identifier>
</metadata>
Figure 5.6: Example record fragments that illustrate the repetition of dc:identifiers
A number of studies have taken a closer look at identifiers and identification systems with
the aim of identifying “persistent” identifiers for resources (Vitiello, 2004; Coyle, 2006; Campbell,
2007a). Activities such as the Persistent Identifier Linking Infrastructure (PILIN) Ontology or
other discussions of identifier systems could provide the basis for constructing an approach to
classifying identifier instances.5
While we may be able to classify different types of identifier strings, it is unclear whether the
LAM community understands them as functioning as referential names in the way that URIs are
used in the model-theoretic semantics of RDF representations. Stvilia et al. (2004) found that
4At least in general, the division between ISBNs that are applied to books and ISSNs that are applied to serial
publications, etc.
5http://www.pilin.net.au/Project Documents/PILIN Ontology/PILIN Ontology.pdf
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identifier was present in 100% of cultural heritage repository records, often with more than
one identifier present. These identifier values exhibited a high degree of uniqueness that allowed
representations to be distinctive, especially when compared to elements such as subject or type
that are intended to collocate representations (Stvilia & Gasser, 2008). However, having a unique
value does not necessarily entail that an identifier refers uniquely to one, and only one, resource.
Stvilia & Gasser’s assessment of metadata quality (2008) assumed that a URL provided access to
a resource and dramatically reduced the value of a metadata record if it failed to provide access
(i.e., if a URL was inaccurate, or a system was unable to deliver a described resource). Within
the present metadata quality literature, the question of whether a URI successfully refers to the
described resource is left unmeasured, especially for the use of URIs that do not provide access
to oﬄine resources, but may successfully refer to them. This suggests that another kind of 1:1
Principle violation may occur if a URI is used to refer to more than one resource.
Semantic Interpretation through Record Context
Implicit in Hutt & Riley’s analysis of values (2005) is an understanding of the contexts in which
metadata was produced and expected to be used. In this case metadata was selected from a known
cultural heritage repository where it was understood a priori that representations are related to
digitized cultural heritage materials with physical and digital manifestations. Likewise, the analysis
in Shreeves et al. (2005) draws on metadata from the IMLS Digital Collections and Content project
(IMLS DCC),6 an aggregation specifically targeted at cultural heritage organizations. Provided this
context, it is possible for a qualitative researcher to infer that two dates, such as “1901” and “2008,”
may represent different kinds of events in the lifecycle of a resource (e.g., creation and digitization).
Likewise, being aware that metadata represents cultural heritage resources heightens our aware-
ness of incoherent format statements that seem to describe the properties of both physical and dig-
ital resources. In a heuristic evaluation of metadata records, qualitative researchers bring a great
deal of background knowledge to their assessments as knowledgeable cultural heritage profession-
als. They may understand that terms like image/jpeg and glass plate negative are properties
that are unlikely to be shared by the same resource. They also may understand that JPEGs are
6http://imlsdcc.grainger.illinois.edu
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the kinds of the things that may “reproduce” something like a glass plate negative, but rarely will
glass plate negatives “reproduce” a JPEG. They also understand that JPEGs are the kind of thing
that might be associated with a date like “2008” and are not things that could have been created
in “1901.”
Not all aggregation environments understand these contextual cues, which offer helpful guidance
in supplying an implicit semantics to XML metadata representations. To a machine-aggregator,
many of these important contextual elements are not accessible in a machine readable form—and
frequently they are not publicly documented for human consumption. For example, Han et al.
(2009) found that many CONTENTdm repositories provided locally defined properties or inter-
pretations of existing Dublin Core properties. While some of these repositories may have followed
published best-practice guidelines, information about which guidelines were used is not provided
by the OAI-PMH repository and may not be represented elsewhere on a repository’s website. Ex-
amination of XML representations merely provides links to more documentation of the syntax (via
the OAI-PMH XML schema, DTDs, etc.).
For human interpreters sensitized to these contexts and armed with a priori notions of records
that should be about one, and only one, resource (with a clear ontological sense of resources being
different manifestations), it is possible to supplement colloquial XML records with a meaning
that leads to the conclusion that records are violating the 1:1 Principle. In the next section we
will explore the difficulties in formalizing these many colloquial heuristics in order to automate
judgments about metadata records.
5.4 Formalizing 1:1 Principle Violations
In order to develop an automated method for identifying 1:1 Principle violations, many of the
assumptions outlined here would need to be represented formally. Attempting to do so reveals just
how difficult it is to translate professional intuitions into formal, machine-understandable languages.
First, colloquial XML metadata records need to be translated into a syntax that supplies
more formal semantics, such as the Resource Description Framework (RDF) or the Dublin Core
Description Set XML (Johnston & Powell, 2008). Haslhofer & Schandl (2008) have provided a
service which directly translates the OAI-PMH syntax into a simple Dublin Core RDF syntax (see
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Example A.6.7 However, as Haslhofer (2008) notes:
Unfortunately, most [metadata schema mappings] do not consider the whole hetero-
geneity spectrum but focus mainly on schema level mappings and disregard the instance
level. . . . Although these kind of mappings suffice for human interpretation, the ques-
tion remains how machines should interpret them in order to provide uniform access
to the sources. They need exact information about relationships between concepts and
precise processing instructions for dealing with the instances or data originating from
heterogeneous sources.. . . . The problem is that even within a single metadata inte-
gration scenario, data sources as well as the mappings created between their metadata
schemes and instances may embody different assumptions on how information should
be interpreted.
An important part of making successful semantic translations is the inclusion and representation
of the contexts that make representations understandable.
As many of the records that appear to “violate” the Dublin Core 1:1 Principleseem also to
conform to widely adopted practices for describing “reproductions” or “visual documentation,”
part of the context that would be necessary to formalize this would be to determine exactly how
to identify what it means to be “a reproduction” or “visual documentation.” What is needed is an
ontology of the kinds of things that are reproductions or visual documentation. As noted before,
current cataloging practice is based on fundamental ontological commitments about the nature of
resources. These commitments then guide the application of particular rule sets for description.
One approach to solving these mapping problems is to use ontologies and/or meta-ontologies
that provide formal representations of contexts. In the case of cultural heritage materials, what
is needed to replicate the kinds of judgments made by human evaluators is an ontology that
defines the classes of resource formats. At present, many metadata instances draw terms from
one or more thesauri, such as the Thesaurus for Graphic Materials8 or the Art and Architecture
Thesaurus.9 These thesauri provide a structured organization of terminology and mechanisms
to ensure that terms uniquely represent concepts (i.e., that they specify term values that avoid
7A similar utility is provided by the SIMILE oaiRDFizer at: http://simile.mit.edu/wiki/RDFizers
8http://www.loc.gov/rr/print/tgm1/
9http://www.getty.edu/research/tools/vocabularies/aat/
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problems of polysemy). While the AAT and TGM provide natural-language definitions for the
meanings of terms and specify what types of resources a term describes, they do not provide any
formal way to represent the properties of the resources they describe (Wielinga et al., 2001). For
example, a term might denote a stylistic convention that was prominent during a particular time
period (e.g., “Late Georgian”). Unfortunately, a representation of a date range (“1760–1811”) that
could be used to evaluate and classify a resource based on an instance of metadata is not available.
Furthermore, thesauri like AAT and TGM provide organizational structures for terms, but
they are not associated with the kinds of formal logic present in languages such as the Web On-
tology Language (OWL). While we might be able to understand that two terms are distinct or
have different taxonomic parents, we are unable to declare that they represent disjoint kinds of re-
sources. In an ontology, we may also wish to include additional information that could help us make
judgements about resources—for example, that nothing created before 1992 can be an image/jpeg.
Even with the power of OWL, some of the intuitive assumptions we use in current 1:1 Principle
heuristics may be outside the inherent capabilities of FOL-based knowledge representation systems
and model theory (for example, see Wickett, 2011).
5.5 Conclusions
Studies that identify 1:1 Principle violations are motivated by concerns about metadata quality
and interoperability. While these studies adopt concepts from the KO paradigm concerning what
syntactical structures count as a record to be evaluated, they apply the KR-based assumption that
these structures must therefore be about one and only one resource. Because the representations
being evaluated are based in colloquial XML syntaxes that are not associated with formal semantic
models, the 1:1 Principle may be unwarranted if other local standards are used as reference sources
for quality evaluation. The heuristics and context that make these studies valid within the KO
paradigm may not easily translate into formal KR methods.
Although Urban (2009) suggested that it would be possible to develop more formal operational
definitions of the 1:1 Principle, this analysis suggests that applying KO heuristics more formally
may be unwarranted. Because the violations that have been identified from the KO perspective
are partially the result of the colloquial semantics of available standards, what is needed are not
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more formal ways of detecting violations, but rather suggestions and guidance for constructing and
using more formal knowledge representation languages that avoid 1:1 Principle problems by the
very nature of their semantic models. While this was an unexpected result of this research, it lays
important groundwork for future research.
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Chapter 6
Contributions & Future Research
It is easier to produce ten volumes of philosophical writing than to put one principle
into practice. —Leo Tolstoy
6.1 Introduction
The Dublin Core 1:1 Principle appears to offer a simple dictum: metadata is about one, and
only, one resource. Despite its apparent simplicity, prior metadata quality research suggests that
widespread violations of the Principle occur, in part, due to the behavior of metadata creators
responsible for conforming to the Principle. This research demonstrates that the violations are not
mere errors, but rather that they conform to long-standing rules for the description of reproductions
within the knowledge organization domain. These rules are enmeshed in a network of conflicting
principles of guidance that require metadata creators and catalogers to balance the needs of users
against the accuracy of their descriptions. Because user needs are more highly valued within
the knowledge organization community, many of the infelicities encountered by metadata quality
research are easily dismissed as being in the service of users. While these kinds of problems
(i.e., multiple date and format values) may impede performance in large-scale aggregations, they
are often seen as necessary to achieve local find, identify, select, and obtain objectives. In these
contexts, the shift in reference between an original and a reproduction is easily navigated by human
consumers of document surrogates.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for machine-understanding of these representations.
To a reasoning system, these document surrogates appear incoherent and contradictory. In order
to prevent such ambiguities, knowledge representation approaches have adopted formal theories
of description and reference as an essential part of their semantics. These semantic models do
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not merely provide a definition of a descriptive vocabulary. They also provide mechanisms that
allow statements to refer to resources. In the formal knowledge representation semantics, the 1:1
Principle is not a suggestion that can be ignored in favor of perceived user needs. It is an essential
feature required for intelligent reasoning tasks.
Because the Open Archives Initiative-Protocol for Metadata Harvesting (OAI-PMH) XML syn-
tax is more closely aligned with knowledge organization attitudes towards document surrogates,
and less so with referential knowledge representations, it is ill-equipped to prevent the kinds of
confusion found by metadata quality studies. Instead, the OAI-PMH syntax enables the kind of
pragmatic solutions that traditionally have been applied within the knowledge organization do-
main. Pragmatic rules for describing reproductions using the MARC syntax create the same kinds
of representation conundrums when implemented using OAI-PMH XML (Miller, 2010). Because
these kinds of flexible solutions are supported by the internal data models used by local metadata
management systems, such as CONTENTdm (Han et al., 2009), the problem with 1:1 Principle
violations does not lie with metadata creators. Rather, if we must identify a violation, it is in
the OAI-PMH DC syntax. As a descriptive language, OAI-PMH DC was not designed to conform
to the expectations of knowledge representation semantics. Indeed, the developers of OAI-PMH
made a conscious choice to adopt a human-readable, document-like syntax over the emerging RDF
specification (Lagoze, 2001b). The challenge may not be in detecting violations, but rather in
finding any OAI-PMH representations that actually conform to the 1:1 Principle as an axiom of
knowledge representation.
The development, application, and misunderstanding of the 1:1 Principle serve as a caution-
ary tale for the cultural heritage community as we move forward with the adoption of Semantic
Web languages. Although this study has not provided solutions for correcting the kinds of viola-
tions identified by metadata quality studies, it identifies many of the complexities that we, as a
community, will have to confront as we shift paradigms.
6.2 Contributions
Although this study does not provide any immediate solutions to resolving the ambiguities found
in individual metadata instances, it makes the following contributions to our general understanding
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of metadata.
1. Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of the development of the Dublin Core 1:1 Princi-
ple. This was absent from earlier metadata quality research. My account demonstrates that
the Dublin Core Metadata Initiative (DCMI) community found it necessary to articulate the
1:1 Principle when the cultural heritage community proposed fundamental changes to Dublin
Core based on existing library, archive, and museum (LAM) description practices. The DCMI
community’s response to these proposals suggests a fundamentally different understanding
of how representation languages could be constructed, one that drew from more recent de-
velopments in computer science and artificial intelligence. The difficulties in articulating
these differences encountered by members of the DCMI community reveal a paradigm divide
between knowledge organization and knowledge representation approaches to representation
languages.
2. In order for us to more clearly understand the confusions, Chapter 3 outlines the features of
the knowledge organization (KO) and knowledge representation (KR) paradigms. An exam-
ination of these features demonstrates that KO and KR adopt distinct methods to achieve
fundamentally different objectives. Among those methods are the theoretical considerations
that define relationships between a resource and a representation. While the 1:1 Principle is
closely aligned with fundamental KR theories of description and reference, it may not cor-
respond to colloquial understandings in KO. This presents a challenge for defining a single,
coherent conceptual definition of the Principle.
3. Chapter 4 identifies the formal theories of description and reference that require knowledge
representation descriptions to be “about one, and only one, resource.” We find that colloquial
bibliographic languages lack a corresponding theory for the relationship between resources and
document surrogates. Because the objectives of each paradigm differ, this is not necessarily
a problem within the framework of each paradigm. However, the differences between these
approaches help to explain the 1:1 Principle problems observed by metadata quality research.
This is especially true when representations created within one paradigm are evaluated using
the criteria from the other.
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4. In Chapters 3 and 4 we find that the 1:1 Principle is associated with theories of descrip-
tion and reference used by the KO and KR paradigms. Because each paradigm handles
this problem differently, Chapter 5 reexamines the assumptions made by previous studies
that have identified 1:1 Principle violations. We find that while metadata quality studies
have articulated valid interpretations of Principle violations from the knowledge organiza-
tion perspective, these are not based on fundamental knowledge representation principles.
Translating the implicit knowledge used by metadata quality researchers into formal knowl-
edge representation interpretations will require additional research.
Although the unexpected complications that arose from identifying and exploring representa-
tion paradigms prevented the development of the concrete operational definitions and the testbed
implementations suggested by Urban (2009), this study has revealed a fertile area for new research.
The importance of exploring the divide between knowledge representation and knowledge organi-
zation will become even more critical as the cultural heritage community moves to adopt Semantic
Web technologies. In what follows, I explore some of the implications of this study for future work.
6.3 Beyond 1:1 Principle Violations
The Dublin Core community created the 1:1 Principle in order to provide guidance for using
what at the time was merely a set of properties of very general resources. The existence of the
Principle in the documentation drew the attention of researchers, who found that it partially
explained the metadata quality problems they observed. Unfortunately, available syntaxes for
expressing Dublin Core, such as the OAI Dublin Core or CONTENTdm’s internal data model, make
it difficult to follow the Principle in practice. Because of these limitations in current approaches,
it is unlikely that encouraging metadata creators to follow the 1:1 Principle will prevent violations
from continuing to occur.
6.3.1 User-oriented Interpretations
One of the reasons given by metadata creators for ignoring the 1:1 Principle is that users’ infor-
mation needs are expressed in terms of the properties of original, analog materials (Shreeves et al.,
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2005; Hutt & Riley, 2005; Park & Childress, 2009; Miller, 2010). These arguments follow from earlier
debates between facsimile- and edition-theory approaches to describing reproductions in the catalog
(Graham, 1992; Svenonius, 2000; Knowlton, 2009). In this scenario, the 1:1 Principle is overridden
by a more important one—the Principle of User Convenience. Within a knowledge organization
system, a user’s need is essentially met by a representation that accurately models his or her un-
derstanding, not a state of affairs in the actual world. Additional research is needed to verify that
the intuitions represented by these arguments are supported by the relevant information-seeking
behavior literature. For example, Lee et al. (2006) explore the problems inherent in known-item
searching when the user possesses inaccurate information.
Ingwersen & Jarvelin (2005) charge that information retrieval (IR) research has largely focused
on laboratory-based approaches that tune systems for maximum relevance using computer science
methodologies. This characterization of IR research is not unlike much of the knowledge rep-
resentation research that provided foundational theories for the Semantic Web. Cognitive-based
approaches were also explored by AI researchers. However, understanding how that work is in-
corporated into contemporary Web-based KR languages like RDF was outside the scope of this
study.
This raises two questions. First, if the facsimile/edition theories represent models that meet
users’ needs, how do we measure these theories’ impact on KO/KR objectives? Second, if these are
useful perspectives, should our formal interpretations directly reflect the users’ views of the world?
If so, it may be necessary to supply multiple interpretations and sets of derived representation
instances. For example, we might supply an interpretation that is valid for internal management of
assets or for inter-repository exchange of representations. Each of these might also be accompanied
with interpretations for the presentation and use of representations for particular user communities.
Such translations would move our understanding of interoperability from being a merely syntac-
tic problem to one that is tied to clear objectives for our representations. To date, interoperability
efforts have placed an emphasis on how representations are constructed, not how we might express
rules and ontological commitments as formal models that can be shared along with representation
instances. While sharing our interpretations may not decrease variation in metadata, it could ease
the work and reduce the costs associated with integrating representations in large-scale aggrega-
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tions where developers must now guess at the intentions of data providers. Shared interpretations
may provide a more successful approach to achieving metadata interoperability.
6.3.2 Dublin Core Application Profiles for Cultural Heritage
Subsequent to the articulation of the 1:1 Principle, the DCMI community has provided recom-
mendations for both record syntaxes (the DCMI Abstract Model (Powell et al., 2007)) and their
use within a particular domain (the DC Application Profiles (Nilsson et al., 2008; Coyle & Baker,
2009)). To date, few of the systems used by cultural heritage professionals to express metadata have
adopted these recommendations in their internal representations (Han et al., 2009; Miller, 2010). A
potential solution to this problem would be for the cultural heritage community to provide a base-
line Application Profile (DCAP) that would specify how Dublin Core syntaxes should be created
for cultural heritage materials. While other application communities (e.g., the Scholarly Works
Application Profile1) provide such models, none has been specified for cultural heritage. Such a
profile could provide a template for accurately representing the relationships between “originals”
and “reproductions” by requiring separate, but related, DCAM description sets for each. Both the
CDWALite and VRACore syntax specifications facilitate these kinds of representations that could
easily be replicated as a DCAP.
Problems are compounded by the failure of OAI-PMH Dublin Core to move beyond a relatively
simple syntax while adoption of the protocol within cultural heritage remains steady. Although the
Open Archives community has provided an alternative that supports richer representations (OAI-
Object Reuse and Exchange, OAI-ORE2), it has not been widely implemented for the exchange
of cultural heritage metadata. An important exception to this observation is the use of OAI-
ORE as the basis of the Europeana Data Model (EDM) (Doerr et al., 2010). Given the issues
surrounding OAI-PMH and 1:1 Principle confusions, an analysis of EDM data may reveal whether
it has effectively solved the problems in practice by using a more robust data model.
1http://dublincore.org/scholarwiki
2http://www.openarchives.org/ore/
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6.3.3 Disambiguation of Existing OAI-PMH Data
This study’s original objective was to be able to define a conceptual definition of the 1:1 Principle,
a definition that would lead to operational definitions for detecting violations. However, merely
being able to detect violations does little to improve services to users. Beyond the ability to detect
violations would be the ability to translate offending representations into new representations that
conform to the 1:1 Principle. Along with the difficulties faced by detection, translation also faces
several hurdles.
First, the language of the current 1:1 Principle and of the studies that identify violations is fo-
cused on two entities: “originals” and “reproductions” (or analog/digital kinds). The developments
that have led to the Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records, however, demonstrate that
there may be multiple layers of entities to which a bibliographic description refers. The development
of an Application Profile, based on FRBR, could provide guidance on the construction of DCAM
descriptions and description sets. However, additional research is needed in order to understand
how to translate existing statements into properly referring descriptions. If we do wish to use more
formal knowledge representation semantics, with their formal theories of reference, constructing
representations based on FRBR would also entail providing mechanisms to provide URIs for each
of the entities referenced by a representation.
As noted in Chapter 5, disambiguating existing OAI-PMH metadata will also require a frame-
work through which to interpret attribute/value pairs where a value changes the interpretation of
the predicate (i.e., through the presence of pseudo-qualifiers in the value). In part this may be ac-
complished by providing a mapping between strings in present metadata and the concepts/things
the string value is intended to represent. Organizing these relationships may be accomplished
through the application of more formal ontologies (for example, in the case of file formats/genres).
Once mapped to an ontology, additional axioms may help identify where inconsistencies exist.
However, because of open-world assumptions, such approaches may only succeed at identifying
inconsistencies that are intrinsic to available metadata. For example, such axioms would not
identify representations that follow a strict facsimile/edition-theory approach by including a note
in the description or source properties. For this reason, additional research is necessary to
systematically evaluate formal rules for disambiguation that proved to be outside the scope of this
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preliminary study.
However, by combining methods of disambiguating ontologically incoherent metadata with im-
proved representation semantics and syntax, we may be able to move beyond merely identifying
1:1 Principle violations and towards solutions that help metadata achieve our objectives for it.
What these techniques will not do, though, is prevent the creation of further incoherent metadata.
Achieving that objective will require new ways of thinking about how we construct bibliographic
descriptions, train and educate metadata creators, and develop systems and workflows that sup-
port knowledge representation objectives. This also will require consensus, or at least widespread
agreement, that knowledge representation’s objectives should supplement and augment existing
knowledge organization approaches.
6.4 The Future of Bibliographic Description
In March 2011, the Library of Congress (2011) announced that it was beginning work to develop an
RDF-based replacement for the MARC format. While that document is a preliminary presentation
of the work ahead, its orientation towards RDF as a syntactic replacement for MARC with a
corresponding discussion of overall bibliographic objectives is worth noting. Attempts to provide
a mapping from existing MARC data elements to RDF demonstrate the difficulties that lie ahead
(Coyle, 2011), but the first steps in this direction demonstrate the importance of this work if
we are to understand new bibliographic models that use knowledge representation languages. At
present, there seem to be very few conversations about the fundamental differences in paradigm
objectives and methods, and in what each entails with regard to syntax. As highlighted by Park &
Childress (2009), metadata creators already suffer from confusion about how to apply fundamental
KR principles like the 1:1 Principle. However, this is just the tip of the iceberg.
Parry & Pratty (2008) ask if we, the cultural heritage community, “understand and need the
semantic web.” For them, a core part of the mission of cultural institutions is to make their
collections meaningful—in part by providing descriptions of our holdings. However, their approach
to semantics illustrates what a slippery concept it is and how it applies to representation formats.
In their estimation, the kind of semantics that cultural organizations supply is a broader sense of
meaningfulness, not the narrow, rigorous semantics that undergirds the formal models of knowledge
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representation languages. Moving forward, we need to understand better how formal semantic
models can be used to represent other colloquial intuitions about the meaning of cultural heritage
metadata.
The questions that arise from contemplating RDF-based approaches to bibliographic data in-
dicate that knowledge organization practitioners will need additional training and support to un-
derstand the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities that they hold. Too often, we immediately
see RDF only from our own perspectives within knowledge organization, and we tend to treat dif-
ferent concepts as if they are equivalent (i.e., proceeding as though RDF graphs are equivalent to
records). Training cultural heritage information professionals to understand knowledge representa-
tion concepts first requires a recognition of how these concepts differ from knowledge organization
concepts.
6.4.1 Do We Need and Understand the Semantic Web?
Identifying the distinctions between the knowledge representation and knowledge organization
paradigms also raises an important question, one posed by Parry & Pratty (2008): do we need
and understand the Semantic Web? The account provided by Parry & Pratty (2008) and others
in the knowledge organization community suggests that we do not. As noted above, from Parry
& Pratty’s perspective, a core part of cultural heritage institutions’ mission is to provide meaning
for our collections. As they note, systematizing rules for cataloging, defining controlled vocabu-
laries, and standardizing data models and syntaxes to exchange information are examples of how
the community currently provides meaning to our representations. Like Parry & Pratty, Campbell
(2007b) too easily equates the meaningfulness of existing knowledge organization methods with
the formal semantics found in knowledge representation languages such as RDF. While knowledge
representation approaches can be studied and critiqued from a Foucauldian perspective, to do so
ignores the fundamental paradigm differences that allow knowledge representation semantics to
function as formal computational systems for intelligent reasoning.
The power that such formal systems promise, however, comes at a cost that the knowledge orga-
nization paradigm—and the World Wide Web—may not be willing to bear. In order to understand
how knowledge organization professionals can best take advantage of more formal approaches, we
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need greater awareness of what these entail. Furthermore, it may be useful for us to understand
the struggles among paradigms that occur within the artificial intelligence and knowledge repre-
sentation communities. For example, the Semantic Web formalisms discussed in my account of
the knowledge representation paradigm have struggled to gain wide adoption on the World Wide
Web. Marshall & Shipman (2003) note that even within the Semantic Web community there are
disagreements about overall objectives and methods needed to achieve them. In a related article,
Shipman & Marshall (1999) outline the difficulties that increasing formalism presents to users of
knowledge-base systems. Not only do such formalisms place a heavier burden on users to un-
derstand the relationships between syntax and semantics, but they often decrease the efficiency of
description tasks by requiring a heavier cognitive load to translate objectives into a formal language
(Shipman & Marshall, 1999). While software agents and interfaces may help reduce this load, this
will also require translating between user tasks and the needs of a formal representation. With-
out a thorough understanding of the differences between knowledge organization and knowledge
representation paradigms, these kinds of translations will not be possible.
McDonough (2008) suggests that perhaps the digital library community “cares less about inter-
operability than we thought,” as is born out by the metadata quality literature. In that literature,
metadata developers “strongly favor local control over encoding practice [that] insur[es] interoper-
ability between institutions” (McDonough, 2008). Here, McDonough is speaking only of syntactic
interoperability, not the more complex kinds of semantic interoperability entailed by formal knowl-
edge representation languages.
That the formalisms of the Semantic Web have not succeeded socially is borne out by the
growing momentum behind the Linked Open Data (LOD) movement (Berners-Lee, 2006). What
has made LOD successful is that it has set aside many of the more formal objectives (such as
intelligent reasoning) of the Semantic Web while retaining the data structures, such as RDF, that
resulted from this line of research. In many cases, more familiar methods from the knowledge
organization paradigm, such as classical information retrieval techniques, have replaced formal
reasoning.
A set of problems, known as the Semantic Web Identity Crisis or http range-14 problem (Hayes
& Halpin, 2008; Halpin, 2011), closely parallels the problems of the 1:1 Principle. At the heart of
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the problem is the question of whether a URI can refer to both an information object that describes
an entity (i.e., a surrogate representation) and the entity being described. Hayes & Halpin (2008)
provide the example of a URI that may refer to the Eiffel Tower itself (the structure in Paris designed
by Gustave Eiffel) and a photograph of the Eiffel Tower (or equally, a set of RDF statements the
Eiffel Tower). According to Hayes & Halpin (2008), what a URI refers to may be specified by the
formal interpretation associated with it. In one interpretation, the URI may refer to the surrogate
representation (the photo); in another, it may refer to the entity the surrogate stands for (the Eiffel
Tower itself). Hayes & Halpin (2008) conform, more or less, to Russell’s Theory of Description (as
interpreted by Tarski and model-theoretic semantics). In contrast, Berners-Lee (2002) argues that
URIs refer to one, and only one, resource, as determined by the agent responsible for “minting”
the URI (in part through the authority bestowed by the owner of a domain name). To date, World
Wide Web consortium recommendations have supported Berners-Lee’s approach (Sauermann &
Cyganiak, 2008).
While this issue remains a hot topic of debate within the Semantic Web/Linked Data commu-
nities, it also illustrates the subtleties of interpretation that result from adopting these kinds of
formalisms. Because this case so closely parallels 1:1 Principle issues, it deserves closer attention
as a way of exploring how the knowledge organization and knowledge representation domains may
find ways to work successfully together to achieve shared objectives. As suggested by McDonough
(2008), “we need to cease viewing this purely as a technical problem, and acknowledge that it is
the result of the interplay of a variety of technical and social factors.” If the cultural heritage
community is to properly assess where and how to use knowledge representation formalisms, we
will need greater understanding of representation paradigms—as sociotechnical phenomena.
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Appendix: Metadata Examples
A.1 Example OAI-PMH Record for the Mona Lisa
<ListRecords>
<responseDate>2011-11-14T05:01:44Z</responseDate>
<record>
<header>
<datestamp>2009-03-02</datestamp>
<identifier>oai:www.louvre.fr/id/779</identifier>
</header>
<metadata>
<title>Mona Lisa</title>
<title> Portrait of Lisa Gherardini,
wife of Francesco del Giocondo </title>
<creator>Leonardo da Vinci</creator>
<publisher>Musee du Louvre</publisher>
<identifier>Inv. 779</identifier>
<identifier>http://is.gd/fFbqI</identifier>
<date>2008</date>
<source>TIFF</source>
<type>image</type>
<format>oil on poplar board</format>
<format>H. 77 cm; W. 53 cm</format>
<format>image/jpeg</format>
<format>16781 bytes</format>
<rights>Copyright 2008 Musee du Louvre/
A. Dequier - M. Bard</rights>
</metadata>
</record>
<ListRecords>
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A.2 Example OAI-PMH for the Mona Lisa using VRACore
<ListRecords>
<record>
<header>
<identifier>oai:www.louvre.fr/id/779</identifier>
</header>
<metadata>
<vra>
<work id="w779">
<title type="popular">Mona Lisa</title>
<title> Portrait of Lisa Gherardini,
wife of Francesco del Giocondo </title>
<agentSet>
<name>Leonardo da Vinci</name>
</agentSet>
<identifier>Inv. 779</identifier>
<format>oil on poplar board</format>
<format>H. 77 cm; W. 53 cm</format>
</work>
<image id="779_jpeg" href="http://is.gd/fFbqI">
<publisher>Musee du Louvre</publisher>
<date>2008</date>
<techniqueSet>
<display>image/jpeg</display>
</techniqueSet>
<measurementsSet>
<display>16781 bytes</display>
</measurementsSet>
<relationSet>
<relation type="imageOf" refid="w779" />
</relationSet>
<rightsSet>
<display>Copyright 2008 Musee du Louvre/
A. Dequier - M. Bard</display>
</rightsSet>
</image>
</vra>
</metadata>
</record>
<ListRecords>
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A.3 Example Dublin Core Description Set for the Mona Lisa
<dcds:descriptionSet>
<dcds:description>
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/alternate">
<dcds:literalValueString>
Portrait of Lisa Gherardini, wife of Francesco del Giocondo
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/title">
<dcds:literalValueString>
Mona Lisa
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/creator">
<dcds:literalValueString>
Leonardo da Vinci
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/identifier">
<dcds:literalValueString>
Inv. 779
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/created">
<dcds:literalValueString>
1501-1519
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/format">
<dcds:literalValueString>
oil on poplar board
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/extent">
<dcds:literalValueString>
H. 77 cm; W. 53 cm
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
</dcds:description>
<dcds:description dcds:resourceURI="http://is.gd/fFbqI">
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/format">
<dcds:literalValueString>
image/jpeg
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/extent">
<dcds:literalValueString dcds:sesURI="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#date">
2008
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/created">
<dcds:literalValueString>
16781 bytes
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
<dcds:statement dcds:propertyURI="http://purl.org/dc/terms/rights">
<dcds:literalValueString>
Copyright 2008 Musee du Louvre/A. Dequier - M. Bard
</dcds:literalValueString>
</dcds:statement>
</dcds:description>
</dcds:descriptionSet>
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A.4 Example RDF Representation for the Mona Lisa
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://louvre.fr/works/779" />
<dc:title>Mona Lisa</dc:title>
<dc:title>Portrait of Lisa Gherardini,
wife of Francesco del Giocondo</dc:title>
<dc:creator>Leonardo da Vinci</dc:creator>
<dc:type>physical object</dc:type>
<dc:identifier>Inv. 779</dc:identifier>
<dc:format>oil on poplar board</dc:format>
<dc:format>H. 77 cm; W. 53 cm</dc:format>
</rdf:Description>
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://is.gd/fFbqI">
<dc:publisher>Musee du Louvre</dc:publisher>
<dc:date>2008</dc:date>
<dc:source>TIFF</dc:source>
<dc:relation rdf:resource="http://louvre.fr/works/779" />
<dc:type>image</dc:type>
<dc:format>image/jpeg</dc:format>
<dc:format>16781 bytes</dc:format>
<dc:rights>Copyright 2008 Musee du Louvre
/A. Dequier - M. Bard</dc:rights>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
108
A.5 Example of an Ambiguous RDF Representation for the
Mona Lisa
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<rdf:Description>
<dc:title>Mona Lisa</dc:title>
<dc:title>Portrait of Lisa Gherardini,
wife of Francesco del Giocondo</dc:title>
<dc:creator>Leonardo da Vinci</dc:creator>
<dc:type>physical object</dc:type>
<dc:identifier>Inv. 779</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>http://is.gd/fFbqI</dc:identifier>
<dc:format>oil on poplar board</dc:format>
<dc:format>H. 77 cm; W. 53 cm</dc:format>
<dc:publisher>Musee du Louvre</dc:publisher>
<dc:date>2008</dc:date>
<dc:source>TIFF</dc:source>
<dc:type>image</dc:type>
<dc:format>image/jpeg</dc:format>
<dc:format>16781 bytes</dc:format>
<dc:rights>Copyright 2008 Musee du Louvre
/A. Dequier - M. Bard</dc:rights>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
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A.6 Example of OAI-PMH XML Translated into RDF by
Haslhofer & Schandl (2008)
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.mediaspaces.info:2020/resource/item/
oai:lcoa1.loc.gov:loc.gdc/gcfr.0018_0163">
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.mediaspaces.info/vocab/oai-pmh.rdf#Item"/>
<oai2lod:setSpec rdf:resource="http://www.mediaspaces.info:2020/resource/set/ascfrbib"/>
<oai2lod:origin rdf:resource="http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
oai2_0?verb=GetRecord&identifier=oai:lcoa1.loc.gov:loc.gdc/
gcfr.0018_0163&metadataPrefix=oai_dc"/>
<owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://example.com/resource/item/oai:example.com/itemX"/>
<dc:title>
Don Christopher Columbus to his friend, Don Louis de Santangel,
on his arrival from his first voyage. At the Azores, Feb. 15, 1493.
</dc:title>
<dc:creator>
Columbus, Christopher.
</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>
America--Discovery and exploration--Spanish--Early works to 1800.
</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier rdf:resource="http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/gcfr.0018_0163"/>
<dc:coverage>
America
</dc:coverage>
</rdf:Description>
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